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I Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1 BACKGROUND 
 
The most often mentioned economic benefits of the removal of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and capital flows are related to the increased international integration of finan-
cial and product markets. The earliest arguments for gains from globalisation are based 
on the idea that international competition promotes economic efficiency. Liberalising 
product and financial markets is seen as a stimulus for international trade and capital 
flows which, through more efficient resource allocation, will increase per capita output 
and ultimately welfare. The recent emphasis on imperfectly competitive markets in in-
ternational trade creates another argument for economic integration as trade reform 
would increase competition, which is also important for efficiency. According to recent 
heterogeneous firm models (see for example Helpman et al. 2003, or Bernard et al. 
2003) the benefits of trade accrue to the most productive firms within industry, whereas 
the costs are felt disproportionately by the least productive. These arguments offer a 
comprehensive treatment of both the microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of 
economic integration. 
The progress of integration with wider trade and capital flows has increased competi-
tion both within and across industries and countries, which has been reflected in the link 
between wage formation and unemployment. There are two major channels - product 
markets and factor substitution - through which economic integration might affect la-
bour markets. International outsourcing, or more specifically the mobility of production, 
has increased as a consequence of product market integration. The liberalisation of capi-
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tal markets has created opportunities for multinational corporations to invest and estab-
lish production plants in countries where they are able to obtain labour more cheaply. 
Generally, it is believed that moving these activities overseas may reduce the relative 
demand for unskilled labour in the economy in much the same way as by replacing 
these workers with automated production. There are a growing number of studies that 
examine whether increased globalisation can be offered as an alternative explanation for 
the shift in the structure of wages and employment in many countries in recent years. 
Revenga (1992), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Borjas and Ramey (1995), Driffill et al. 
(1998), Burda (1999), Boeri et al. (2000), and Haffner et al. (2000) suggest that changes 
in the competitiveness of product markets have a significant effect on both employment 
and negotiated wage settlements. The main idea behind this explanation is that foreign 
competition reduces firms' power in product markets and thus drives down labour`s 
rents. This indicates that employment changes in a small group of trade-impacted con-
centrated industries can explain not only part of the aggregate rise in wage inequality in 
the United States, but also some of the trends in wage inequality that have resulted in a 
clear rise in joblessness in European countries. Rodrik (1997) identifies the elasticities 
of labour demand as an equally important channel through which an increase in global-
isation can affect labour markets, while Slaughter (2001) finds an unclear relationship 
between the increasing elasticity of labour demand and economic openness. Recently, 
the issue that has attracted most attention is whether international outsourcing has con-
tributed to a shift in labour demand for different types of workers and consequently a 
change in wage inequality (e.g., Görg and Hanley 2005, Hijzen et al. 2005, Senses 
2006, and Hijzen 2007). The consensus in the empirical literature suggests that interna-
tional outsourcing has contributed to the upward trend in the elasticities of labour de-
mand with own price, and consequently to a change in the skill structure of labour de-
mand and an increase in the wage differential between high and low skill wages.  
Arguments related to the costs of globalisation are typically based on the contention 
that changes in the degree of product market competition can affect labour practices 
during the process of integration where firms face aggregate and industry-specific 
shocks. The loss of national adjustment variables as integration progresses will result in 
an increased need for alternative flexible mechanisms i.e., flexible wage structures with 
low labour mobility, to correct possible asymmetric shocks across industries and coun-
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tries. Rodrik (1997, 1998) explains that when the shock to the product market is a nega-
tive one, there is a larger decrease in employment in more open economies. Conse-
quently, competitive pressure on the labour market towards greater flexibility is ex-
pected to increase as a result of lower trade barriers. Haffner et al. (2000) find evidence 
that both product market competition and labour market flexibility have been fostered 
by integration. For the adjustment variables of labour markets, one issue is that profit 
sharing has increased considerably in Finland and in many other European countries. 
Profit sharing can be seen as a way to introduce wage flexibility into the process of eco-
nomic integration, generating a link between imperfections in the product market and 
employment. There is, however, a clear need to understand that the creative destruction 
caused by export is associated with the reallocation of resources from less efficient to 
more efficient firms, which may generate more job creation than job destruction. 
One macroeconomic aspect of globalisation is that increasing job mobility implies a 
correction of the distortions arising from the taxes and social security contributions lev-
ied on labour with consequent effects on state´s ability to pursue welfare policies, and, 
more specifically, on the possibility of financing the public sector by general labour 
taxation without job losses. There have been significant changes associated with the 
rapid re-structuring of the European economies resulting in increased globalisation of 
those economies and a clear rise in joblessness. Alesina and Perotti (1997) find that an 
increase in government expenditure financed by distortionary labour taxation generates 
a loss of international price competitiveness. The cost of the extended welfare state, 
especially in Northern European countries, during international integration may be a 
higher level of unemployment via distortions arising from general labour taxation. Con-
sequently, it can be argued that the ability of the welfare state to improve employment 
through fiscal activities is progressively reduced when product market competition in-
creases. 
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold to investigate the effects of economic in-
tegration on labour demand by using theoretical models and by empirical analysis. The 
dissertation consists of three essays which can be read independently of each other. The 
goal of the first essay is to provide evidence on how the elasticities of labour demand 
with own price have changed during the process of economic integration. The second 
essay deals with the problem of maintaining a welfare state financed by distortionary 
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labour taxation while closer economic integration affects the impact of welfare policies 
on employment. The last essay analyzes the impact of profit sharing on employment as 
a way to introduce wage flexibility into the process of economic integration. 
All three essays adopt an intra-industry trade approach to specify a theoretical 
framework of estimation for determining the effects of economic integration on em-
ployment. While the effects of economic integration can work through many different 
channels, in the first and third essays, a theoretical model captures both effects ranging 
from product markets, the scale effects, as well as factor substitutions possibilities, and 
the substitution effects in order to analyze the effects of economic integration. In the 
second essay, economic integration is mainly associated with market power, which 
makes it possible to capture the main quality effects in a manageable way. Furthermore, 
it is supposed, in this essay, that there is another sector - a public sector producing non-
tradable goods solely for the domestic market. Intra-industry trade may be defined as 
the two-way exchange of goods in which neither country seems to have a comparative 
cost advantage regarding differentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive 
firms. As Helpman and Krugman (1989) have pointed out, it is a phenomenon that first 
attracted attention during the rapid expansion of trade in manufactured goods that fol-
lowed the creation of the European Common Market.1 Although the constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functions exhibit constant returns to scale, intra-industry trade is 
supposed to be characterised by an advantage of economies of scale in production. To-
gether with interaction between the number of firms and the degree of price competi-
tion, intra-industry trade and economic integration can be seen as the result of the inter-
action between product differentiation and economies of scale. 
The Finnish case is of broader interest. Since Finland is a small, open EU-country, 
economic integration can have a more profound effect on employment in Finland than 
in large countries. The pressures of globalization are also particularly pronounced in 
Finland because it is one of the Nordic welfare states, with a high level of taxation and 
benefits. There was global increase in trade before and after the severe recession of the 
                                                 
1 The completion of the Single European Market, which was scheduled to have occurred by 1992, was 
intended to complete the process of removing barriers to trade among the countries of the European Un-
ion. The establishment of the European Monetary Union is asserted to strengthen this process of integra-
tion further by increasing competition in the international product and capital markets. As Calmfors 
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early1990, however, it is noteworthy that trade flows remain concentrated regionally, 
i.e. the EU was not significantly more open at the beginning of this decade than it was 
some decades ago. There has been an increase in trade, but most of this growth is con-
centrated on growth between European countries. However, figure 1.1 shows the total 
trade share for the manufacturing sector between non-OECD countries (especially 
China and India) and Finland has been growing rapidly in recent years. Thus, the pattern 
of EU competition now is dominated by the domestic and East Asian economies. 
 
 
Figure 1.1  The Share of Manufacturing Trade (imports and exports) with EU15, OECD and non-OECD 
of the Total Finnish Manufacturing Trade. 
 
In all the essays the empirical aim is to explore the consequences of European integra-
tion while a careful empirical assessment of the labour demand consequences of global-
isation will have to wait for the relevant data. The first essay uses plant-level panel data 
from the Finnish manufacturing sector with European integration measurements at the 
industry level. The empirical part of this essay examines the impact of European inte-
gration on the elasticities of labour demand in Finland during 1975 - 2002. The empiri-
cal aim of the second essay is to determine whether European integration has changed 
                                                                                                                                               
(1998, 2001) argues, a common currency reduces trade barriers, and therefore leads not only to more 
trade, but also to more foreign direct investment. 
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the impact of welfare policies on employment. This is tested using panel data from 
European countries from 1975 to 2004. The last essay utilizes linked employer-
employee firm-level panel data from the Finnish manufacturing sector which is linked 
with European integration indicators from 1996 to 2004. This empirical section focuses 
on the question of the relationship between the intensity of economic integration and 
employment in the presence of profit sharing. 
 
2  CONTENTS OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
2.1  Economic Integration and the Elasticities of Labour Demand: 
Econometric Evidence from Finland 
 
The first essay investigates the effects of economic integration on the elasticity of la-
bour demand with own price. Economic integration, when it is associated with market 
power, can, in theory, either increase or decrease labour-demand elasticity. With in-
creased integration and competition firms, with access to the wider market are expected 
to be able to expand sales and production to take better advantage of economies of 
scale. Thus, market power may arise from specialization in production and differentia-
tion of products in order to establish segmented markets. This might in turn decrease the 
elasticity of labour demand. In contrast Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter (2001), for in-
stance, have emphasized the possibility, particularly in imperfectly competitive con-
texts, that the elasticity of demand for labour is higher with greater openness. As 
Slaughter (2001) has pointed out, the link between factor demand elasticities and prod-
uct market elasticities is directly established through Hicks-Marshalls fundamental law 
of factor demand, which implies that the demand for anything is likely to be more elas-
tic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce. 
Since product market elasticities are likely to rise with integration, this implies that, 
with greater trade openness, we should see an increase in labour-demand elasticities as 
well. Furthermore, Senses (2006) suggests that international outsourcing should con-
tribute to the upward trend in the elasticity of labour demand. 
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In our general theoretical model of intra-industry trade, the purpose is to examine 
the main channels through which the elasticity of labour demand is affected by interna-
tional integration. In regard to the demand for labour and capital we can derive the own-
price elasticity of labour demand, and derive the substitution and scale effects for the 
elasticity of labour demand. It is shown that intensified trade competition increases la-
bour-demand elasticity, whereas better advantages from economies of scale decreases 
labour-demand elasticity by decreasing the elasticity of substitution between differenti-
ated products. Internationalisation can also affect the relative demand for unskilled la-
bour through intermediate input markets, by foreign outsourcing, or by investing. We 
show that, if integration gives rise to an increase in input-substitutability and/or out-
sourcing activities, in particular, the demand for unskilled labour will become more 
elastic. 
The empirical work is closely related to tests of the Factor Price Equalization (FPI) 
theorem, although the theorem does not depend on substitution between inputs and 
market power with differentiation of products. The theorem, according to which free 
trade, and accordingly the equalization of relative product prices between countries, 
implies that relative factor prices also have to be the same between countries, even in 
the absence of perfect factor mobility. Even when labour mobility is low, product mar-
ket integration will force product price and factor price convergence for production fac-
tors of similar quality. When the mobility of capital increases as consequence of integra-
tion, domestic workers can be substituted with other factors, either through trade or 
through investing. Trade barriers make the movement of labour and capital more costly 
and more risky, and prevent the complete equalization of factor prices. Empirical re-
search by Slaughter (1997), Faini et al. (1998) and Greenaway et al. (1999)  suggests 
that trade may contribute to increased elasticities, however, they find weak support for 
the hypothesis that greater globalisation is associated with larger elasticities. However, 
Jean (2000) finds that openness can indeed have a significant effect on labour-demand 
elasticities. 
In this essay, the empirical aim is to determine whether European integration has 
changed the own-price elasticities of labour demand in Finland using plant-level panel 
data from the manufacturing sector with integration indicators at industry level from 
1975 to 2002. The analysis provides evidence that, over time, demand for total, produc-
 8 
tion and non-production labour has overall become more elastic in manufacturing. 
However, there is, unexpectedly, more relative growth in elasticities for non-production 
labour than for production labour. Furthermore, own-price demand elasticities of both 
labour types are underestimated. Because of the problem of separating inputs which has 
led to an underestimation of price elasticities for both labour types, only the effects of 
integration on the elasticities of total labour demand are assessed. If both the constant-
output (constant-substitution) and scale-effect (substitution-effect) elasticities of labour 
demand were consistently estimated then the difference between them would be an es-
timate of the scale effect (substitution effect). The estimation results show that the dif-
ference between the constant-output (constant-substitution) and scale-effect (substitu-
tion-effect) elasticities of labour demand actually were more of an estimate of the scale 
effect (substitution effect) over integration. These main results provide support for the 
hypothesis that economic integration has contributed to an overall increase in labour 
demand elasticity. 
 
2.2  Welfare Policies, Labour Taxation, Employment and Economic 
Integration: Econometric Evidence from European Countries 
 
The second essay investigates how economic integration affects the impact of welfare 
policies on employment. In regard to empirical studies on the intersection of public fi-
nance and labour economics, several contributions have looked at the effects of taxation 
on unemployment, particularly in closed economies. For example, a paper by Daveri 
and Tabellini (2000) finds a relationship between rising unemployment and a slowdown 
in economic growth due to higher taxes on labour. In particular, this essay considers the 
possibilities of financing public sector through the general taxation of labour in an 
economy which is becoming more integrated into international product markets. In or-
der to study this issue, the theoretical analysis is divided into two parts. First, the effects 
of welfare state activities and labour taxation on wage formation and employment are 
clarified. It is supposed that labour markets are unionized, which generates rigidities in 
the wage setting process. A permanent increase in labour income taxation leads the un-
ion to demand higher real wages to compensate for the decreased post-tax income, and, 
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as a consequence of higher labour costs, firms demand less labour. Second, we examine 
how these effects depend on the level of international product market integration. 
Using a general theoretical model, we show that the effects of economic integration 
on the impact of welfare policies and on employment depend conclusively on a trade-
off between intensified competition and better advantages from economies of scale. 
Since product market price competition is likely to rise with integration, this implies 
that, with greater trade openness, we should see, in turn, an increase in the cost of main-
taining welfare systems. Increasing job mobility implies a correction in the distortions 
arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour, which then affects 
a state´s ability to pursue welfare policies, i.e. to uphold the level of public consumption 
and social security expenses. On the other hand, market power may arise from speciali-
zation in production and the differentiation of products in order to establish segmented 
markets. This might decrease the cost of maintaining welfare systems. As increased 
trade competition crowds out better advantages from economies of scale, it becomes 
more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by labour taxation.  
The empirical aim, in this essay, is to determine whether European integration has 
changed the impact of welfare policies on employment using panel data from European 
countries for the years 1975 - 2004. The countries which we consider here are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. During this period 
these countries went through significant changes associating with a rapid re-structuring 
of their economies, which reflected increased globalisation in the world economy. This 
long period offers us an interesting chance to examine the effects of integration on the 
impact of welfare policies in respect to labour demand. Assuming that integration has 
influenced the effects of welfare policies, it is also necessary to determine the effects of 
welfare policies on employment for the periods before and during the process of inte-
gration. In addition, labour market institutions are important determinants of employ-
ment. Thus, EU-countries have been classified in order of the centralisation of their la-
bour markets. 
The estimation results provide some support that the scale effects of international in-
tegration strengthen the negative impact of the labour tax rate on employment. How-
ever, the scale effects of integration weaken the negative impact of transfers on em-
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ployment, although this negative impact increased during integration. Furthermore, it is 
shown that integration weakens the positive impact of public consumption on employ-
ment. Overall, these results provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that eco-
nomic integration has contributed to the distortionary effects of welfare policies on em-
ployment. 
 
2.3  Profit Sharing, Economic Integration and Employment: Econo-
metric Evidence from Finland 
 
The last essay investigates how economic integration affects the impact of profit sharing 
on employment. The role of profit sharing in changes in net employment is discussed 
here in reference to profit sharing as method of payment based on a firms´ performance, 
as opposed to the payments of base wage. Commitment to profit sharing serves as a 
strategic device for creating a reduction in the negotiated base wage, thereby generating 
a link between the imperfections in the product market and employment. Empirical 
studies of the effects of profit sharing have typically focused on its impact on productiv-
ity and employment through productivity effects (see for example Cahuc and Dormont 
1997, Kruse 1991, and Wadhwani and Wall 1990). Weitzman (1985, 1987) argues that 
the merit of profit-sharing is that it guarantees stability of employment in the face of 
economic shocks. The theoretical arguments rely crucially on the assumption that firms 
use the base wage and not the total level of remuneration as the relevant marginal cost 
of labour. Wage systems have a negative macroeconomic externality, while profit-
sharing systems have favourable externality effects on employment and, indirectly, on 
price stability. It is argued that if there is a general rise in product market competition, 
the loss of rents will be shared by firms and workers with no overall impact on em-
ployment (see Geroski et al., 1995, for example). In line with their view, intensified 
competition in product markets could be expected to affect the impact of profit sharing 
on employment. Furthermore, Bernard et al. (2006) find that economic activity is real-
located towards high-productivity firms as trade costs fall in a given industry. The bene-
fits of economic integration result from access to larger markets, and therefore larger 
profits and possible economies of scale. 
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In theory, the impact of profit sharing on employment in the context of economic in-
tegration clearly depends on a trade-off between intensified competition and better ad-
vantages from economies of scale. A comparatively high degree of product market 
competition will make labour demand more elastic and shift it outwards. Due to rent 
sharing behaviour, wage rates can be expected to be inversely related to product market 
competition. Hence, it can be argued that the ability of profit sharing to improve em-
ployment through economic integration is progressively increased when product market 
competition increases. However, there is case in which firms might choose to pay 
higher wages when they have market power and are earning higher monopoly rents. 
This implies that when economic integration leads to greater market power it might in 
turn decrease the tendency towards profit sharing in terms of higher wages and have a 
negative effect on employment. 
In our theoretical model, it is shown that, if product market competition increases, 
the ability of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration in-
creases due to more moderate wages. The main explanation of this result is that with 
heightened foreign competition unions face a situation where labour demand is more 
elastic and thus moderate their wage demands. Simultaneously economic integration, 
when linked together market power, in turn decreases the tendency towards profit shar-
ing in terms of higher wages, thus preventing improvements in employment. In addi-
tion, it is shown that, if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in-
creases during the process of integration, incentives for using profit sharing decrease 
with higher relative labour price, which decreases labour demand. 
Profit sharing increased considerably in Finland during the late 1990s. In the empiri-
cal section of the last essay, the aim is to determine whether European integration has 
changed the impact of profit sharing on employment in Finland, using employer-
employee firm-level panel data from the manufacturing sector linked with European 
integration indicators for years 1996 - 2004. The datasets used for the analysis consist of 
two panels: sample from profit-sharing firms and sample from non-profit-sharing firms. 
One important feature is that profit-sharing firms, which are larger than non-profit-
sharing firms, perform better in international product markets. This nearly always leads 
to the conclusion that profit-sharing firms are subject to greater international competi-
tion with access to a wider product market while non-profit-sharing firms are more shel-
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tered from economic integration. In addition, labour costs are higher in profit-sharing 
firms which indicate a higher ratio of skilled workers than in non-profit-sharing firms. 
To understand the impact of profit-sharing on employment, a useful method is to com-
pare the estimation results of the sample of profit-sharing firms with and without the 
effects of economic integration. Another practicable method is to use a specification 
including the interaction term with profit sharing for the total sample of profit-sharing 
and non-profit-sharing firms.  
The estimation results provide support for the view that economic integration 
strengthens the positive impact of profit-sharing on employment. However, we do not 
find that profit-sharing firms exhibit greater employment stability during the process of 
economic integration. These results provide evidence for the hypothesis that profit-
sharing improves employment during the process of economic integration, but has an 
unclear effect on the stability of employment. 
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II  Economic Integration and the Elasticities of La-
bour Demand: Econometric Evidence from Finland 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
By using theoretical model and empirical analysis, we investigate the effects of eco-
nomic integration on the elasticity of labour demand with own price. Using a general 
theoretical model of intra-industry trade, we analyze how economic integration changes 
labour-demand elasticity. We show that intensified trade competition increases labour-
demand elasticity, whereas better advantage of economies of scale decreases the elastic-
ity of labour demand by decreasing the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
products. If integration gives rise to an increase in input-substitutability and/or outsourc-
ing activities, labour demand will become more elastic. We test the idea of whether 
European integration has changed labour-demand elasticities in Finland using data from 
the manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2002. Overall, the results provide support for the 
hypothesis that economic integration has contributed to increased elasticities of total 
labour demand. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic integration is a process in which markets for goods and factors of production 
tend to become perfectly integrated. Competition for the location of capital and produc-
tion is becoming ever more fiercely as a result of globalization. As Rodrik (1998, 2000) 
argues, open economies, which are free to trade with each other, differ from closed 
economies in respect to the fact that, in particular, capital and employers are interna-
tionally mobile.2  The liberalisation of financial markets and the European community 
programme for liberalising the goods markets throughout Europe have already made 
considerable progress towards globalizing European economies. Liberalization of the 
flow of capital in the mid-1980s has, in addiction, effectively created one common mar-
ket for financial capital. However, local demand for capital is less than perfectly elastic, 
so capital is neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile. As de Ménil (1999) em-
phasizes, there do appear to be significant differences in rates of return on capital within 
EU countries. Liberalising the capital markets in effect created opportunities for multi-
national corporations furthermore to invest and establish production plants in countries 
where labour is cheaper.3 The completion of the Single European Market, which was 
scheduled to occur by 1992, was intended to complete the process of removing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade within EU countries. The mobility of production has also 
increased as a consequence of product market integration. The progress of integration 
with wider trade and capital flows has strengthened competition between EU countries, 
which has been reflected in the labour market. On the other hand, greater competition is 
offset by the fact that firms with access to wider markets should be able to expand sales 
and production to take better advantage of economies of scale while continuing to cover 
production costs despite lower price-cost margins. 
 
                                                 
2 On the other hand, as Osmundsen (1999) discusses, barriers to labour mobility have been lowered by the 
creation of the EU internal market, and education and language skills have improved, implying enhanced 
international mobility of the workforce. 
3 Wildasin (2000) explains that labour mobility contributing to either lower real wages or higher unem-
ployment worsens especially the welfare of low skilled workers, which are easier to substitute with for-
eign workers. 
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It is claimed that the establishment of the European Monetary Union strengthens this 
process of integration further via increasing competition in international product and 
capital markets. As Calmfors (1998, 2001) argues, during the process of integration a 
common currency reduces trade barriers (both in terms of transaction costs and ex-
change-rate risks with international payments), and therefore leads not only to more 
trade, but also to more foreign direct investment.4 The primary objective of European 
Monetary Union is price stability, which forces countries to adjust to low inflation and 
to pay attention to firms competitiveness. Due to EMU, member-states lose the oppor-
tunity of using the exchange rate as an instrument to correct macroeconomic disequilib-
ria.5 In particular, they cannot devalue their own currency so as to restore international 
price competitiveness. The loss of national adjustment variables, such as the exchange 
rate or the interest rate, will result in an increased need for alternative flexible mecha-
nisms to correct possible asymmetric shocks among EMU-countries.6 Product demand 
will become more sensitive to price differentials between different countries and firms 
location decisions more responsive to relative labour costs. Burda (1999) speculates that 
if nominal price rigidity (correlation of nominal wage movements) in Europe increases, 
then real rigidities (correlation of real wage growth) is likely to decrease, as a conse-
quence of EMU, which calls for labour market flexibility. This adjustment would help 
the region to improve its competitive position. Therefore, competitiveness will pressur-
ize the need for the labour market towards ever greater flexibility under EMU, and this 
will result in the further lowering of trade barriers. 
Over the past few years, the effects of European economic integration on the labour 
market have attracted wide interest. While there has been some increase in trade with 
countries outside the European area, it is a fact that the region remains fairly closed with 
the consolidated share of trade with non-EU countries remaining about ten percent of 
total GDP. In contrast, trade within the region has rapidly increased (see OECD 1999). 
                                                 
4 EMU will eliminate the transaction costs incurred in exchanging currencies, make information less 
costly, and reduce political risk as the monetary policy is transferred to the European Central Bank (see, 
e.g., de Ménil 1999, p. 185). 
5 Currency devaluation can be used to reduce domestic costs in foreign-currency terms, thereby offsetting 
the loss in competitiveness (see, e.g., Rodrik 1998, p. 4). 
6 In addition, as Andersen et al. (2000) explain, European countries may be affected differently by 
changes in inter-industry trade, which are more relevant for southern European countries, and intra-
industry trade, which are more relevant for northern Europe. 
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The purpose of this study is to examine, using theoretical models and empirical analy-
sis, the impact of economic integration on the own-price elasticity of labour demand. 
The empirical aim is to determine whether European integration has increased or de-
creased own price elasticities in Finland. Economic integration with its corresponding 
effect on market power can in theory increase or decrease labour-demand elasticity. 
With increased integration and competition firms with access to the wider market are 
expected to be able to expand sales and production to take better advantage of econo-
mies of scale. Thus, market power may arise from specialization in production and 
product differentiation in order to establish segmented markets. This might in turn de-
crease the elasticity of labour demand. In contrast Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter (2001), 
for instance, have emphasized the possibility, particularly in imperfectly competitive 
contexts, that labour-demand elasticity is higher with greater openness. As Slaughter 
(2001) points out, the link between factor demand elasticities and product market elas-
ticities is directly established through Hicks-Marshalls fundamental law of factor de-
mand, which implies that the demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more 
elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce. Since prod-
uct market elasticities are likely to rise with integration, this implies that, with greater 
trade openness, we should see an increase in labour-demand elasticities as well. How-
ever, from a theoretical point of view, as Panagariya (2003) has shown, Rodriks con-
jecture that globalisation has a positive effect on labour-demand elasticity, finds little 
support. As a consequence, the validity of the relationship has to be determined empiri-
cally. 
First, the purpose is to examine the main channels through which the elasticity of la-
bour demand is affected by international integration. We focus on how product market 
integration can, in theory, change the elasticity of labour demand. This general model of 
intra-industry trade specifies a theoretical framework of estimation for the elasticities of 
labour demand and the determining of the effects of economic integration on elastic-
ities. Intra-industry trade may be defined as the two-way exchange of goods in which 
neither country seems to have a comparative cost advantage. As Helpman and Krugman 
(1989) point out, it is a phenomenon that first drew attention during the rapid expansion 
of trade in manufactured goods that followed the creation of the European Common 
Market. There are two major channels through which integration might affect labour 
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markets: product markets and factor substitution. From the demand for labour and capi-
tal we can derive the own-price elasticity of labour demand, and derive the substitution 
and scale effects for the elasticity of labour demand.  
Second, the empirical work focuses on determining the effect of European integra-
tion on the elasticities of labour demand. This has been tested using data from the Fin-
nish manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2002. Our empirical work is closely related to 
tests of the Factor Price Equalization (FPI) theorem, although the theorem does not de-
pend on substitution between inputs and market power with differentiation of products. 
The theorem, according to which free trade leads to the equalization of relative product 
prices across countries, implies that relative factor prices also have to be the same 
across countries, even in the absence of perfect factor mobility. Even when labour mo-
bility is low, product market integration will force product price and factor price con-
vergence for production factors of similar quality. When the mobility of capital in-
creases as consequence of integration, domestic workers can be substituted by other 
factors, either through trade or through investment. Barriers to trade make the move-
ment of labour and capital more costly and more risky, and prevent the complete equali-
zation of factor prices. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on identifying the main chan-
nels through which economic integration affects labour-demand elasticities. It specifies 
a theoretical framework for empirical analysis. Section 3 formulates the econometric 
model. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation strategy, 
and reports on the empirical results. A few concluding remarks and suggestions for fu-
ture analysis are given in the last section. 
 
2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS 
 
2.1  Theorems of international trade 
 
The labour market effects of integration running via changes in relative factor supplies 
are captured by the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of 
traditional trade models connects trade with factor supplies. The HO model identifies a 
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mapping from exogenously given factor supplies and exogenously given external prod-
uct prices determined in the international market place into internal factor prices, output 
levels and consumption levels, the difference between these last two items being inter-
national trade. (See, e.g., Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, p. 1345.) Thus, pressure on fac-
tor prices comes from trade with countries with dissimilar relative endowments. The 
empirical prediction of the HO model is that a country should export the goods in which 
it has a comparative advantage and import the goods in which it does not. However, 
Leontief (1953) observed that the US, which was at that time by far the most capital-
intensive country in the world, exported relatively labour-intensive products. Another 
approach to testing the implications HO theorem is to see if the pattern of net exports 
within an individual country conforms to what would be expected on the basis of the 
relative factor endowment of that country. For example, using US data, Baldwin and 
Cain (1997) report estimates of relative comparative advantage as a function of factor 
shares across industries producing tradable goods. Their results suggest that the US 
tends to be a net exporter of goods and services that are relatively education-intensive. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem7, one of the HO models, connects factor prices with 
product prices. The theorem describes a mapping from prices determined externally in 
international markets to prices determined internally in local markets. The result applies 
if the external markets determine the price of commodities and the internal markets de-
termine the price of factors. An increase in the relative price of a good yields an in-
crease in the real return on the factor used intensively in that good and a decrease in the 
real return on the other factors. The empirical prediction of the theorem is that under 
certain conditions8 the prices of individual factors across different countries - in the ab-
sence of tariffs or other impediments to free trade - tend to equalize. Andersen (2005) 
has emphasized, using the Stolper-Samuelson proposition that the relative wage of un-
skilled workers in European countries should decline if the integration process is associ-
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, pp. 1345-1348. 
8 One of these assumptions is that the technology of the production of each good is identical in each coun-
try. Several papers (e.g., Trefler, 1993 and 1995; Davis et al., 1997; Harrigan, 1997) have revisited the 
HO prediction with specifications that allow for the estimation of inter-country differences in technology 
to be an additional source of comparative advantage. The results of these studies, when technology differ-
ences are taken into account, are, at least, qualitatively consistent with the predictions of the HO model: 
countries tend to be net exporters of the services of the factors in which they are relatively abundant. An 
interesting aspect of Trefler (1995) is his conclusion that observed trade flows also reflects inter-country 
technology differences. 
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ated with a decline in the relative price of commodities intensive in low skilled labour. 
The weaker position of low skilled workers may more generally appear in the form of 
lower relative wages or a higher incidence of unemployment for low skilled workers in 
European countries. Wage dispersion may be rising just as differences in employment 
prospects are growing between geographical areas and among workers with different 
levels of education.9 
If an economys relative endowment equals that of the rest of the world, then when 
economies are more integrated they experience, via the HO theorem, no change in 
product prices and thus, via the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, no change in wages. But 
integration can make foreign factors more substitutable with domestic ones. The 
Rybczynski theorem10 depends on substitution between inputs within sectors. The theo-
rem connects output levels with factor supplies. It relates changes in endowments to 
changes in the pattern of production. When product prices are fixed, an increase in the 
quantity of one factor will give rise to a more than proportional increase in the output of 
the good which uses that factor intensively and a reduction of the output of other goods. 
Then, pressure on the elasticity of labour demand comes from dissimilar relative en-
dowments, regardless of international trade. For example, using panel data from two 
industries Harrigan (1995) explains production levels as functions of national factor 
endowments. The results suggested that capital was a source of comparative advantage 
in both industries, while skilled labour was a source of comparative advantage in one 
industry, and unskilled labour a source of comparative disadvantage in both. 
The Factor Price Insensitivity (FPI) theorem11 connects factor prices with factor sup-
plies. Within a country, factor prices are completely insensitive to changes in factor 
supplies, when product prices are fixed. Johnson and Stafford (1999) explain, according 
to the FPI-model, that changes in relative factor supplies have no effect on relative fac-
tor prices. The empirical study by Slaughter (1997) is close to a direct test of the FPI-
theorem. The theorem according to which free trade leads to the equalization of relative 
product prices across countries implies that relative factor prices also have to be the 
same across countries, even in the absence of perfect factor mobility. Slaughter con-
                                                 
9 This depends on a trend towards more decentralized wage formation giving a larger role for wage set-
ting at the firm level. 
10 See, e.g., Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, pp. 1345-1346. 
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ducted his test to demonstrate whether, as the U.S. economy became more open, there 
was a corresponding increase in the absolute elasticity of labour demand. Although, as 
Andersen and Sørensen (2000) summarize, the theorem relies on a number of crucial 
assumptions, one of which is that there is perfect competition in product markets. This 
assumption is counterfactual for a number of products and nor does factor price equali-
zation necessarily follow from free trade. Market power arises, among other things, 
from specialization in production and the differentiation of products in order to establish 
segmented markets. Another assumption is that the demand for labour during integra-
tion is infinitely elastic. This requires a factor supply variation that is too small to lead a 
country into a different range of specialization. In addition, neither the FPI-theorem 
with the HO theorem nor the Stolper-Samuelson theorem depends at all on substitution 
between inputs within sectors. 
 
2.2  A Model of the Elasticity of Labour Demand and Product Market 
       Integration 
 
We will formulate a general theoretical model of intra-industry trade in order to capture 
the effects of product market integration12 on the elasticities of labour demand. The fo-
cus is on how the process of integration is reflected, via the removal of barriers to inter-
national trade, substitution, and outsourcing, in labour-demand elasticities. We consider 
an open economy where there are many firms at industry level producing differentiated 
good Yj  with capital K j , skilled labour jSL  and unskilled labour jUL  as inputs. Capital 
and skilled labour are mobile between countries, while unskilled labour is immobile. 
Adapting the model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), where there is assumed to be no strate-
gic (Bertrand or Cournot) interaction between firms, when product markets are imper-
fectly competitive, there is monopolistic competition in good markets.13 The structure of 
this general model is such that consumers demand a variety of differentiated products. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
11 See, e.g., Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, p. 1354. 
12 The integration process is implying more integration across product markets. 
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We suppose for simplicity that all industries produce only differentiated products.14 
Representative consumers tastes are represented by the utility function 
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ε  is the product-demand elasticity, and ∗jP   represents an index of 
the price level in terms of international integration. Product-demand elasticity can be 
thought of as an increasing function of the number of products ( )jjj nεε = , where 
( ) 0>′ jj nε , and jn  is the number of products/firms in industry j. An increase in the 
number of firms leads to an increase in the degree of competition. The demand of prod-
ucts type i is given as 
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13 This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm has some 
power over the pricing of its product. 
14 It is possible to suppose that there is a sector producing the outside good only for domestic market. 
15 We image an economy that is able to produce a large number of products, all of which enter symmetri-
cally into demand. 
16 Each consumer maximises their utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint. The budget con-
straint simply requires that the value of expenditure is not more than value of the income. 
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where jip  represents the price of variety i with 1>jφ  denoting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two products types (see Helpman and Krugman 1989). An industrys 
elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods can be thought of as a decreasing 
function of the advantage of economies of scale ( )jjj aφφ = , where ( ) 0<′ jj aφ , and 
*
j
j
j A
A
a ≡  is an exogenous comparative productivity for domestic industry relative to 
foreign industries. A growth in the advantage of economies of scale in a given industry 
leads to a decrease in the degree of substitution among differentiated goods within that 
industry.17 
Consider now the impact of a reduction in marginal trade costs on product markets. 
Let jτ  denote a trade cost due to transaction costs and other trade barriers related to 
foreign trade18 in industry j. The effects on imperfectly competitive product markets of 
increased integration via declining trade costs are basically of two counteracting sorts. 
Hence, integration turns out to vary competition by varying both advantages of econo-
mies of scale holding jε  constant, and the number of firms holding jφ  constant. First, 
individual producers with access to the wider market are expected to be able to expand 
production to take better advantage of economies of scale ( ja ). This is associated with 
reduced market imperfection and the increased incentive of product-differentiation. 
Hence, we assume that 
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Second, market entry becomes easier and/or less costly implying that more goods be-
come traded goods ( jn ). With increased integration and competition, an industrys mar-
                                                 
17 Together with interaction between the number of products/firms and the degree of price competition, 
intra-industry trade and economic integration can be seen as the result of the interaction between product 
differentiation and economies of scale. Each industry contains a large, but limited because of economies 
of scale, number of potential differentiated products that consumers regard as imperfect substitutes. Given 
the opportunity to trade, industries will specialize in the production of different ranges, while the degree 
of price competition will increase. 
18 For simplicity, we assume that the trade costs of import and export outputs are equal. 
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ket share becomes increasingly sensitive to price changes, raising the elasticity of the 
consumption price. Thus, we have 
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The higher the degree of price competition, i.e. the closer substitutes the good sale on 
the world market is, the more elastic with respect to the own price output demand be-
comes.  On the other hand, if the initial competitiveness of a domestic industry is much 
better than the competitiveness of a foreign industry, an increase in the degree of com-
petition tends to give rise to higher supply by taking better advantage of economies of 
scale. 
The relative price *
j
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 is chosen by the firm. In imperfect competition, we have then 
the condition of a pricing rule for product types in industry j 
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A given variety i within industry j is offered by firms at a price jip  in terms of the over-
all price index ∗jP , in terms of various trade costs jτ  related to foreign trade in industry 
j, and in terms of the comparative productivity of a domestic industry relative to a for-
eign ja . At the optimum, price equals the marginal revenue from exporting, and the 
relative trade cost equals the mark-up factor i.e. 
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 (see, e.g., Helpman 
and Krugman 1989, p. 18). We summarize the characterization of the optimal pricing 
rule in 
 
Proposition  1  Lower trade costs with increased integration, a higher number of firms 
and, in consequence, a higher elasticity of product demand will reduce the mark-up 
 25 
price, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, a lower 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will raise it, ceteris paribus. 
 
Furthermore, international integration gives access to foreign factors of production as 
well as domestic ones, either directly through foreign affiliates or indirectly through 
intermediate inputs. As Burda and Dluhosch (2000) discuss, the removal of barriers to 
trade and mobility between countries will increase incentives for firms to economize on 
variable costs by outsourcing or fragmenting the production process. In this sense, an 
enlarged market can drive an endogenous evolution of technology, which in turn affects 
the factor markets by imported intermediate inputs. Together with labour costs, a 
change in capital costs affects firms´ price setting. A firm considers the gross interest 
rate of industry ~rj as given. It is given by the net-of-tax interest rate plus a capital tax, 
i.e. ~ ( )r t rj r j= +1  with tr  denoting the capital tax rate.
19 The gross wage of industry jw~  
consists of net-of-tax wages20  plus social security contributions wt , so that we have 
jwj wtw )1(~ += . Let the unit costs of international outsourcing for industry j be denoted 
jλ , and assume that these costs have a cumulative distribution function given by jψ . 
There are monitoring, switching and friction costs involved in letting an activity be out-
sourced.21 Then it is profitable for the firm to outsource activities if 
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which applies for a fraction 
 
                                                 
19 Other capital costs are mainly the depreciation of capital. 
20 A rise in income tax increases labour costs when the rise in income tax is compensated for by an in-
crease in negotiated wages. 
21 As Wildasin (2000) argues, capital and labour are not actually homogeneous factors of production, but 
rather aggregates of many specific types of inputs. Firms cannot without costs alter their stocks of capital 
and labour. The adjustment of production in response to shocks in the product market incurs costs be-
cause it is costly to replace plant and equipment, and to hire new workers. 
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The cumulative distribution function ( )jjj τλψ ,  is also parameterized on trade costs 
( jτ ) reflecting the effect of increased integration on the switching costs of outsourcing. 
Integration may lower the switching costs involved in outsourcing activities. Hence, we 
have 
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The first inequality implies that the input-share becomes more sensitive to the relative 
input-price when the switching costs of outsourcing are decreased. The second inequal-
ity says that more integration (lower trade costs) for a given relative input-price (switch-
ing costs) increases the share of firms which choose outsourcing. 
Assuming that linear-homogenous technology can be represented by CES (constant 
elasticity of substitution)22 cost function form and a strong separable between unskilled 
and skilled labour23, the total cost function 
 
(2.11) jggj CC ∑=  
 
                                                 
22 The CES function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, intra-industry trade may give rise to take 
advantage of economies of scale in production. 
23 Empirical studies usually point to a lower degree of substitution between skilled labour and capital than 
between unskilled labour and capital. Integration forces changing labour substitutability by making labour 
less/more easily substituted for foreign factors of production depending on complementarity between 
human capital and physical capital (see, e.g., Skaksen and Sørensen 2002, or Feenstra and Hanson 2001). 
However, as Hamermesh (1993) discuss, the difficulty with the production function ( )( )KLLHFY SU ,,=  
is that the aggregation of labour inputs by the function H is an arbitrary description of technology. If 
labour sub-aggregates are not separable from capital, one will underestimate own-price demand elastic-
ities, and infer that the types of labour are greater price-substitutes that in fact they are. Because of this 
problem of the separable of inputs I also estimate the elasticities of total labour demand. 
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can be specified as the sum of sub-CES cost functions of the form 
 
(2.12) [ ] jgjgjg jgjgjgjgjjg rwYC σσσ ψψ −−− −+= 1 111 ~)1(~  
 
where j and g refer to industry and input groups, respectively. Industry js elasticities of 
substitution between capital and unskilled or skilled labour are denoted jgσ . The elas-
ticity of substitution is defined as the effect of a change in relative factor prices on the 
relative inputs of these two factors, holding output constant (see Allen 1938, or Hamer-
mesh 1993). The distribution parameter jgψ  can be defined an index of augmenting 
technological change, which is related to international outsourcing. In particular, in-
creased imported intermediate inputs should mainly affect unskilled workers who find it 
more difficult to adjust to this imported technological change. The CES function allows 
values 0≥jgσ , which can be thought as parameterized on trade costs ( jτ ), to reflect the 
fact that integration expands the set of factors by increasing the mobility of capital.24 
Thus, firms can substitute other factors of production for immobile workers more easily 
by investing. If the elasticity of substitution is great, as labour costs rise relative to capi-
tal costs, labour will be substituted for capital.25  
We assume imperfect competition in the product market i.e., each single firm at in-
dustry j´s level faces a downward sloping demand curve 
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24 Kauppi et al. (2004) establish the useful relationship between capital and labour markets. They show 
that, since employment is negatively related to the wages and capital is negatively related to the rate of 
interest, labour demand and the capital price are either positively or negatively related as well, if the elas-
ticity of substitution between labour and capital is different from one. Hence, there is a negative (positive) 
relationship between labour demand and the capital price if the elasticity of substitution is below (above) 
one. Juselius (2005) finds a negative long-run relationship between unemployment and the interest rate 
using Finnish manufacturing data which is consistent with an elasticity of substitution above one. 
25 When there is a rise in labour costs, the relative price of capital in terms of labour in a given industry 
will decline i.e. capital here will be relatively cheap. As a result, competitive forces will lead to the adop-
tion of more capital-intensive techniques of production than elsewhere. In case of the unitary elasticity of 
substitution, the capital/labour ratio will also change by equal percentages as the factor-price ratio. If the 
elasticity of substitution is less than one, an increase in the price of labour must induce firms to use more 
capital, but the increase in the use of capital is not equal relative to an increase in labour-price. 
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The closer substitutes for output Yj  on the international market are, the more elastic 
output demand becomes.26 Profit maximization implies that firms will set a price which 
exceeds the marginal cost by a constant mark-up factor, i.e. 1
1
>
−+
+
jj
jj
εφ
εφ
. During the 
process of integration, there are pressures for mark-ups to fall along the increasing elas-
ticity of product demand.27 On the other hand, a decrease in product-substitution elastic-
ity may compensate for this effect. A firm maximizes profits, which are given by 
 
(2.14) Π j j j j j j j jp Y Y w L r K= − −( ) ~ ~ . 
 
Profit maximization, with respect to labour, yields the conditional labour demand func-
tion 
 
(2.15) [ ] jgjgjgjgjg jgjgjgjgjgjjgjg wrwYL σσσσσ ψψψ −−−− −+= ~~)1(~ 111  
 
Group gs cost function can be written as jjgjgjgjjgjgjg YrwcYrwC )~,~(),~,~( =  in industry j. 
The share of labour and capital costs in total costs is defined for group g 
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)1( ≡− , respectively, with )~,~( jgjgjgjg rwcc =  denoting group gs unit and 
marginal cost of production in industry j. Marginal cost solely depends on gross factor 
prices. Labour demand is affected by the share of labour in total costs. If this share is 
low, then a percentage increase in labour costs will have a smaller impact on total costs 
                                                 
26 Applying one of the four Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, the demand for anything is likely to 
be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce 
(Hicks 1966, p. 242). 
27 Whenever an economy faces a larger number of firms in an integrated world market, trade itself leads 
to a decline in mark-ups. Hence, the degree of competition tends to increase when more goods become 
traded. When individual firms face increased competition in product markets, it is intended that they 
should lower their mark-ups of prices over marginal costs. For instance, Hoon (2001) has affirmed that as 
domestic and foreign firms compete in the markets for traded goods, there are pressures for mark-ups to 
decline. 
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than, if the share of labour is large (see, e.g., Booth 1995, p. 58). The own-price elastic-
ity of labour demand can be derived (see Allen 1938, or Hamermesh 1993) as 
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~~  is the elasticity of outsourcing for industry j with the price of 
labour type g. In equation (2.16), 
jgLL
η  is the elasticity of labour demand for industry j  
with the own price for group g; 
jgLL
σ  is group gs elasticity of substitution between la-
bour and capital in industry j; jφ  is the elasticity of product substitution, and ε j  the 
elasticity of product demand for industry js output market. Equation (2.16) consists of 
three parts. The first part shows, for a given level of output, how much firms substitute 
away from labour type towards capital when labour costs rise. For example, an increase 
in social security contributions shifts the labour demand curve inward by increasing the 
cost of labour (see, e.g., Pissarides 1997, p. 5). As Holmlund et al. (1989) explain if 
there is complete nominal wage rigidity, employment takes the whole burden of adjust-
ment.28 The second part of equation (2.16) shows how much an industrys labour de-
mand changes after a labour cost change in response to a change in the industrys out-
put. For example, higher (lower) wages imply higher (lower) costs and thus, moving 
along the product-market demand schedule, lower (higher) industry output. The third 
part shows how much an increase in wage costs gives rise to a switch towards more 
outsourcing. In summary, when labour costs have risen, an industry will substitute away 
from labour towards capital or switch towards more outsourcing, and with higher costs 
the industry produces less output such that it demands less all factors.29 
 
 
                                                 
28 If there is, correspondingly, complete nominal wage flexibility, the increase in social security contribu-
tions is completely shifted back on to wages. 
29 Similarly, a cut in social security contributions shifts the labour demand curve to the right. Both real 
wages and employment rise, but how much does the impact on wages and employment depend on the 
own-price elasticity of labour demand? 
 30 
 
In theory, economic integration can change the elasticities of labour demand without 
changing labour prices. Differentiating of equation (2.16) with respect to trade costs it 
gives the effect of increased product market integration on labour-demand elasticity 
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During the process of integration, international trade can increase the elasticity of labour 
demand through the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, which is cap-
tured by the first term on the right hand side of equation (2.17). As a consequence of 
decreased trade costs ( jτ ) as industry js substitutability increases (i.e., jgLLσ  rises), 
labour demand becomes more elastic (i.e., 
jgLL
η  falls). The smaller labour costs are as a 
share of a firms total costs ( jgs ), the stronger the pass-through from the elasticity of 
substitution to the elasticity of labour demand is. In other words, the higher the wages 
the larger the drop in the quantity of labour demanded and the less important labour is in 
total costs. As Rodrik (1997) argues, the increasing mobility of capital means that the 
demand for labour will generally be more responsive to changes in factor prices. Firms 
can substitute other factors of production for immobile workers more easily by invest-
ing.30 However, if an industry is specialized in a skill-intensive sector, the own-price 
elasticity of labour demand should be lower in that industry than in an industry that spe-
                                                 
30 Generally, the demand for any factor of production becomes more elastic when the others can respond 
to changes in the economic environment with greater ease (Rodrik 1997, p. 17). As the costs of capital 
mobility fall via the removal of both exchange rate risks and the costs of transaction, capital owners are 
more responsive to move their capital to a country where it earns a higher return. As Rodrik and van 
Ypersele (2001) explain, in the process of integration, real and financial capital is more sensitive to 
shocks such as changes in productivity or the terms of trade. A negative shock at home may induce a 
capital outflow abroad. A capital outflow is also liable to affect the marginal productivity of labour, in 
turn leading to effects on wages (see, e.g., Keen and Marchand, 1997). An increase in capital productivity 
tends to increase relative labour costs, which may encourage shifting production determining by higher 
productivity. Particularly in production with low-skill workers, employers can react sensitively to changes 
in prevailing wages by investing. 
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cializes in a low skilled labour intensive good.31 In addition, shifts in production tech-
nology or an increase in the use of physical capital also requires workers to obtain new 
skills, which increases the demand for human capital (i.e. 0>
∂
∂
j
LL jg
τ
σ
) and thus de-
creases the elasticity of skilled labour demand.  
Another substitution effect is the incentive to outsource, which is captured by the 
third and last terms on the right hand side of equation (2.17). By using equation (2.10), 
as a consequence of decreased trade costs ( jτ ) it follows that as industry js outsourcing 
becomes more elastic (i.e., 
jgw~ψη  rises) and the probability of outsourcing increase, (i.e., 
jgψ  falls) labour demand becomes more elastic (i.e., ηLLj  falls). The smaller the share 
of labour-input costs is the stronger the pass-through from the probability of outsourc-
ing to the elasticity of labour demand is. Integration thus expands the set of factors in-
dustries can substitute indirectly towards in response to higher domestic wages beyond 
domestic non-labour factors to include foreign factors.32 Whereas, in a skill-intensive 
industry, when the elasticity of substitution between skilled labour and capital is small 
( 1<
jgLL
σ ) with a high share of labour-input costs ( jgs ) and an initially low outsourcing-
probability ( jgψ ) the effect of increased outsourcing-elasticity on labour-demand elas-
ticity can be compensated for partly by the effect of the increased probability of out-
sourcing. Intuition says of the counteracting effect of outsourcing that labour costs will 
become a relatively more important cost-component when a larger proportion of activi-
ties are outsourced. We summarize the substitution effects of integration in 
 
 
                                                 
31 In the case of labour demand with several inputs, adopting more capital-intensive production will de-
crease the demand for low-skilled workers and increase the demand for educated workers. As a result, a 
rise in the cost to employers of using physical capital will decrease the demand for educated workers used 
at each level of production. In the case of complements, the elasticity of substitution is low so a rise in the 
price of capital also leads to a decrease in employment. 
32 Slaughter (2001) emphasizes that industries need not actually access foreign factors, the ability to do so 
is sufficient to increase the elasticity of labour demand. 
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Proposition  2  Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher elasticity of substi-
tution between labour and capital and/or higher elasticity of outsourcing with the 
higher probability of outsourcing will increase the elasticity of labour demand. 
 
So the integration process should increase substitution, directly or indirectly, and eco-
nomic integration should tend to further increase the elasticity of labour demand, espe-
cially that of unskilled labour. 
If product markets are imperfectly competitive, integration can also make product 
markets more competitive via international trade. Several models of imperfect competi-
tion predict that trade liberalization makes demand more elastic, but not infinitely so.33 
The market shares of a domestic supplier and a foreign supplier become more sensitive 
to relative price when economies are more integrated. International integration which 
reduces trade frictions and therefore makes it easier to shift supplier, can have poten-
tially large effects on product-elasticities. Rodrik (1997) argues that since the demand 
for labour is a derived demand which varies proportionately with the elasticity of de-
mand for goods, the integration of goods markets alone makes the demand for domestic 
labour more elastic because of declining mark-ups.34 Trade flattens the demand curve 
for labour and increases the elasticity of demand for labour. 35 However, by using (2.4) 
and (2.5), differentiation (2.17) shows that as a consequence of decreased trade costs 
( jτ ) as the number of products/firms rise ( jn ) industry js product demand becomes 
more elastic (i.e. ε j  rises), as does labour demand (i.e., jgLLη  falls), while as advantage 
from economies of scale rise ( ja ) product substitution becomes less elastic (i.e. jφ  
                                                 
33 In a perfectly competitive international market, output price decreases as demand decreases, and firms 
take the market price of an output as given. Supposing decreasing returns to scale, each firm decreases 
labour demand to the level where price equals marginal cost (see, e.g., Varian 1992, pp. 215-216). The 
models of international trade (e.g., Heckscher-Ohlin model) with perfectly-competitive product markets 
have the extreme result of infinitely-elastic product demand and thus infinitely-elastic labour demand. 
34 Also increased information allows firms to respond more effectively to cost differences. Increased 
comparability means that the labour market impact of changes in profits increases and thus the elasticity 
of labour demand increases. (See Rauch and Trindade 2000, p. 7.) 
35 Rodrik (1997, 1998) explains that when the shock of product market is a negative one, there is a larger 
decrease in employment in more open economies. A consequence of integration is greater instability in 
labour-market outcomes when openness magnifies the effects of shocks on labour demand. An inward 
shift and a flattening of the demand curve for labour reduce average earnings. Increased trade and invest-
ment opportunities for employers make it more costly for workers to achieve a high level of labour stan-
 33 
falls), as does labour demand (i.e. 
jgLL
η  rises). The larger labours share of total costs, 
the stronger the pass-through from the elasticities of product to the elasticities of labour 
demand. The number of firms (both domestic and foreign) competing in this kind of 
industry can arise as a result of the integration process, which shifts the foreign output 
mix towards this kind of industry. The integration process can force domestic firms to 
face heightened foreign competition. An increase in the elasticity of product demand 
triggered by there being more firms increases the elasticity of labour demand.36 Product 
demand becomes more price elastic when product markets are more integrated, but is 
the effect of product market integration on the price sensitivity of market share larger 
than its direct effect on market share? For example, an individual industry with access 
to the wider market might be able to expand sales and production taking better advan-
tage of economies scale, which can be associated to decreased market imperfections and 
thus decreased labour demand elasticities. Because of these counteracting effects we 
cannot conclude that the scale effects of integration tend to increase labour-demand 
elasticity. We summarize the scale effects of integration in 
 
Proposition  3  Lower trade costs with increased integration, a higher number of firms 
and, in consequence, higher elasticity of product demand will increase the elasticity of 
labour demand, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, 
lower elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will decrease it. 
 
Finally (2.17) reveals the following result 
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dards and benefits. The larger the elasticity of demand for labour, the higher the share of any such costs 
that must be borne by the workers themselves. 
36 Tefler (1995) suggests that when consumers regard home and foreign product varieties as imperfect 
substitutes, overall industry product-demand elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign varieties. If the integration process eases substitution, it increases the overall industry 
elasticity of demand and thus the derived elasticity of demand for labour. 
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which implies that economic integration makes labour demand more elastic, if increased 
trade competition crowds out better advantages from economies of scale and input-
substitutability increases. 
In summary, labour-demand elasticity involves two different effects of an increase in 
the degree of integration, the substitution and scale effects. In the present set-up, eco-
nomic integration can change the own-price elasticity of labour demand by increas-
ing/decreasing either both of the product elasticities, (demand and substitution), or the 
elasticity of direct substitution between factors of production and outsourcing activities. 
The process of integration reduces trade barriers, and therefore leads not only to more 
trade, but also to more foreign investment. Increased trade, outsourcing, and investment 
opportunities make firms more sensitive to changes in such costs. When unskilled la-
bour is immobile, and the mobility of other factors is increasing as consequence of inte-
gration, workers can be substituted with other workers abroad, either through trade or 
through outsourcing. Then integration can make labour demand more elastic either by 
making output markets more competitive or by making domestic labour more substitut-
able with foreign factors. However, the effect of integration on the price sensitivity of 
market share may be compensated by its direct effect on market share, i.e. an industrys 
market power can arise from specialization in production and differentiation of prod-
ucts, which allows better economies scale. In addition, if an industry is specialized in a 
skill-intensive sector, shifts in production technology or an increase in the use of physi-
cal capital also requires workers to acquire new skills, which increases the demand for 
human capital, making labour demand less elastic. Thus, the effect on labour-demand 
elasticities of increased integration is more of an empirical question. 
 
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
The elasticities of labour demand are estimated, as Hamermesh proposes, using a log-
linear specification where the quantity of factor employment is regressed on real factor 
prices and real production. In response to the logarithmic form of the conditional labour 
demand equation (2.15), the parameters correspond to the own-price elasticities of la-
bour demand, enabling the described integration effects to be determined on the elastic-
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ities. In the short run, a change in the price of labour will induce a change in output, i.e. 
elasticities include the scale effect. The short run elasticities would be estimated without 
production, or with production as constant. (Hamermesh 1986, p. 449.) Assuming that 
the scale returns are constant we estimate the constant-output elasticities of labour de-
mand using restricted least squares procedure. For each year, this suggests the following 
regression equation for estimating constant-output elasticities:37 
 
(3.1) itittittittit eYL +∆+Ψ∆+∆=∆ )ln()ln()ln()ln( βµωα  
 
where L is the quantity of labour employed (either both types of workers  or total work-
ers), ω real labour costs, Ψ real capital costs, Y real output, and β = 1  with constant 
output. i indexes plants, and t the year. The individual parameter α  is the estimate of 
the elasticity of labour demand with respect to own price when production is constant. 
Hamermesh (1983) argues that the measurement error introduced by average wage 
measures biases elasticity estimates up towards zero; but with this measurement error in 
other factor prices as well the net bias is unclear. However, if the measurement-error 
bias is relatively constant over time, the true pattern in elasticity time trends is relative 
unaffected. Thus, as Slaughter (2001) argues, the primary concern should be trends over 
time in elasticities rather than their levels. It is assumed that there are no significant time 
lags between changes in factor prices and a plants labour demand responses. Hamer-
mesh (1983) reports that typical adjustment lags are six months to one year, so, in the 
annual data, lags should not be too important at the plant level. 
If both scale and constant-output elasticities are consistently estimated, the difference 
between them is the estimate of the scale effect, and it would provide indirect evidence 
on the competitiveness of product markets; and thus the impact of integrations scale 
effects on labour-demand elasticities can be determined. To estimate the scale effect 
elasticities of labour demand for each year suggests the following regression equation: 
 
(3.2) itittittittit uYL +∆+Ψ∆+∆Φ=∆ )ln()ln()ln()ln( βµω  
                                                 
37 Taking logarithms in conditional labour demand, equation (2.15) yields to a form which is very useful 
for estimation. 
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The individual parameter Φ is the estimate of scale effect labour-demand elasticity 
when scale returns are not constant. Scale effect β measures the impact of an interna-
tional demand shock on labour demand. This estimate of the instruments of the scale 
effect measures the impact of change in product demand on labour demand. If demand 
for the products of an industry were to increase, more outputs could be sold at the same 
price, and thus the production level would rise as firms in the industry maximize profits, 
and this effect would increase labour demand. We use two different instrument vari-
ables: the share of Finlands exports to EU-countries in manufacturing production and 
the share of the output of the European Union in manufacturing production, which are 
deflated by a real competitiveness indicator where euro-country weights are based on 
Finlands bilateral exports. Both two instruments vary by industry and year. The first 
attempts to measure foreign demand for Finlands products, and the second attempts to 
measure overall demand in the European Union. Furthermore, a real competitiveness 
indicator measures international product market competition. If these regressors do not 
adequately control for shifts in the demand of product markets then estimates of Φ are 
likely to be biased upwards. In that case, positive shocks to product-market demand, and 
thus labour demand would raise plants´ wages, for example, because of rent sharing. 
Similarly, for each year, equation, (3.3) can be used to estimate the constant-
substitution elasticities of labour demand: 38 
 
(3.3) itittittit eKL +∆+∆=∆ )ln()ln()ln( χωρ  
 
where K  is capital stock, and 1=χ  with constant investment. The individual parameter 
ρ is the estimate of the elasticity of labour demand with respect to own price when capi-
tal stock is constant. If both substitution and constant-substitution elasticities are consis-
tently estimated, then the difference between them is an estimate of the substitution ef-
fect, and it would provide indirect evidence on international outsourcing activities; and 
thus the impact of integrations substitution effects on the labour-demand elasticities 
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can be determined. To estimate the substitution effect elasticities of labour demand for 
each year suggests the following regression equation: 
 
(3.4) itittittit uKL +∆+∆Γ=∆ )ln()ln()ln( χω  
 
The individual parameter Γ is the estimate of the substitution effect elasticity of labour 
demand when capital stock is not constant. The substitution effect χ measures the im-
pact of an international outsourcing shock on labour demand. This estimate of the in-
struments of substitution effect measures the impact of a change in the demand for non-
labour inputs on labour demand. If demand for non-labour inputs were to increase, in-
duced by increased demand for outputs and an increased production level, this effect 
would increase labour demand. We use two different instruments: the share of interme-
diate inputs that are imported from EU-countries in production, and the share of the 
investment of other EU countries in Finland´s domestic investment, which are deflated 
by a real competitiveness indicator. Both instruments vary by industry and year. The 
first attempts to measure foreign intermediate input outsourcing, and the second at-
tempts to measure overall substitution between labour and investment. 
 
4  DATA 
 
The elasticities of labour demand are estimated using assembled panel data from the 
manufacturing sector39 based on a diversity of sources: Statistics Finland´s Longitudinal 
Database on Plants in Finnish Manufacturing (LDPM), the Bank of Finland´s Financial 
Market Statistics, the National Board of Customs´ Foreign Trade Statistics, and the 
OECD STAN Database´s Industrial Structure Statistics.40 The panel data covers the 
period from 1975 to 2002. Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of the observations. 
The ideal data here, as Slaughter (1997) argues, would be firm-level data because firms 
                                                                                                                                               
38 Profit maximization with respect to capital yields the conditional capital demand function, substituting 
this conditional capital demand into equation (2.15), and taking logarithms yields to a form which is very 
useful for estimation. 
39 Unfortunately there are no comparable data for the service sector. 
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are the relevant units that actually demand factors. However, plant-level data sets do not 
contain firm-level trade-prices and measurements of foreign demand (supply) for firm-
level products (non-labour inputs), so the next best alternative for these integration 
measurements is the use of industry-level (2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries) data. 
Demand estimation requires figures for employment, real factor prices, real investment 
and real output for all plant-year observations. The deflating variable is a producer price 
index for (3-digit ISIC) the manufacturing industry maintained by Statistics Finland. 
The National Accounts Statistics include annual data from 1975 to 2002 for manufactur-
ing plants, covering variables such as production, investment, the price of investment, 
employment (production and non-production workers), and nominal wages and em-
ployer social security payments for production and non-production workers. Labour 
demand is supposed to have a negative correlation with labour costs. The higher the 
labour costs, the lower the labour demand. Employment comes directly from the data 
set as the number of production and non-production workers. For each worker type and 
for total employment I construct real labour costs as nominal annual wages and social 
security payments deflated by the producer price index and divided by the number of 
workers. For investment, the price index comes directly from the LDPM panel. In the 
case of substitution, when capital costs rise, an industry substitutes away from capital 
towards labour.41 Then labour demand is supposed to depend on the capital costs posi-
tively.42 
For equations (3.2) and (3.4), I calculate the real competitiveness indicator as the 
nominal competitiveness indicator multiplied by the trade ratio of export and import 
prices. The constructed nominal competitiveness indicator for the period 1975 - 2002 is 
based on Financial Market Statistics maintained by the Bank of Finland.  The industrial 
prices of exports and imports are based on the Producer Price Indices of Statistics 
Finland. An increase in the real competitiveness indicator means that an industrys price 
competitive ability decreases, therefore decreasing product demand and thus labour de-
mand. Thus, a declining competitiveness indicator should mean that the international 
                                                                                                                                               
40 Manufacturing industries are included using the standard ISIC classification, i.e. excluding petroleum, 
energy, and quarrying. For the 2-digit ISIC classification there are all 27 manfacturing industries. 
41 Empirical studies reviewed by Hamermesh (1993) usually point to a lower degree of substitution be-
tween skilled labour and capital than between unskilled labour and capital (see, e.g., Griliches 1969, 
Bergström and Panas 1992, Biscourp and Gianella 2001). 
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product markets are more competitive, and that all factor demands are more elastic via 
the scale effect. 
 
Table 4.1 Variable summary statistics. 
 
Variable (logarithm)     Obs          Mean      Std. Dev.      Min          Max 
Production (real)  158181        7.611        1.652       -2.669        15.49 
Capital stock (real)  141142        6.116        2.265  -5.433        13.69 
Price index of investment  153406       -0.491        0.373  -1.320        0.233 
Number of total workers  160203        3.373        1.290        0.000        8.715 
Number of production workers  152698        3.123        1.269        0.000        8.402 
Number of non-production workers 141412        2.034        1.392        0.000        8.557 
Real labour price (total)  160194        2.997        0.484  -1.670       7.150 
Real labour price (production)  152688        2.885        0.472  -3.031       6.920 
Real labour price (non-production) 141384        3.259        0.515  -1.612       7.587 
Exports share (real)  155166        11.13        1.759  -2.364       22.97 
EU-output share (real)  155166        17.88        1.738        9.405       28.40 
Intermediate inputs share (real)  155166        10.88        2.034  -0.399       23.01 
EU-investment share (real)  138432        16.64        2.307   8.981       28.93 
 
 
For the equation (3.2), we use two different instrument variables: the share of 
Finlands exports to EU-countries in manufacturing production and the share of the out-
put of the European Union in manufacturing production. Industrial exports to EU-
countries are based on Foreign Trade Statistics maintained by the National Board of 
Customs. Another instrument variable, the production of European Union for each in-
dustry, is based on OECD Industrial Structure Statistics. Finally, I construct real output, 
another endogenous variable, as nominal production divided by the producer price in-
dex. A rise in exports increases the production of an industry, which is supposed to in-
crease the labour demand. In theory, labour demand correlates positively with produc-
tion. If product demand rises and thus production increases, firms demand for factors 
rises. The assumption is that higher exports signal better economies of scale (or less 
foreign competition).43 This makes all factor demands less elastic via the scale effect. 
On the other hand, the more the rest of the EU accounts for the output of an industry, 
the more competitive that industry is for Finnish firms and thus the more elastic all fac-
tor demands will be via the scale manufacturing effect. 
                                                                                                                                               
42 Conversely, in case of complementarity, labour demand depends on capital costs negatively. 
43 Péridy (2004) finds using data of four EU countries over the period 1975 - 2000 that exports unambi-
guously rise with the degree of scale economies. 
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For equation (3.4), we use two different instruments: the share of intermediate inputs 
that are imported from EU-countries in manufacturing production and the share of the 
investment of other EU countries in domestic investment. Imported intermediate inputs 
from EU-countries for each industry are based on Foreign Trade Statistics maintained 
by the National Board of Customs. Another instrument variable, the industrial invest-
ment of the European Union, is based on OECD Industrial Structure Statistics. Finally, I 
calculate real investment, another of the endogenous variables, as nominal investment 
divided by the producer price index. If demand for non-labour inputs were to increase as 
a result of increased demand for outputs, thus causing a rise in production level, this 
effect would increase labour demand. While foreign outsourcing and/or international 
investment provides an alternative to many production-intensive plants, and thus de-
creases dependence on production labour, it also increases reliance on human capital 
and thus non-production labour. Therefore, increased foreign outsourcing and/or inter-
national investment is assumed to make demand more elastic, especially for production 
labour, via the substitution effects. 
 
5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Concerning studies of Finland, Tuomiaro (2001) focuses on labour demand adjustment 
by studying what kind of impact the internationalization of firms in the retail and 
wholesale sector and foreign ownership have on the structure of the employed labour 
force during the period 1989 - 1996. His dynamic analysis reveals that export intensity 
correlates positively with labour demand for all age groups and for those not highly 
educated. Furthermore, changes in output or wages have a greater influence on em-
ployment in domestically owned companies than in foreign-owned companies.44  The 
study does not focus on effects of the economic integration on the elasticities of labour 
                                                 
44 This result can be explained, in part, by the fact that foreign-owned companies belong normally in 
Finland to the largest firms where the elasticity of labour demand is smaller than in small and medium-
sized firms. Using firm-level data Piekkola (1998) explains labour demand by the firms financial posi-
tion and corporate profitability. The results show that there was no increase in the wage elasticity of la-
bour demand in large firms over the period 1986-1995 and in small and medium-sized firms over the 
period 1990-1996, aside from that explained by financial distress. The study confirms previous evidence 
that labour demand is more sensitive to the economic cycle in large firms. On the other hand, labour de-
mand is more flexible in small and medium-sized firms. 
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demand, but it addresses how the internationalization of firms affects the structure of 
employed labour force adjustment during a recession. In addition, it only considers the 
retail and wholesale sector. Also, the period over a deep depression is problematic. A 
study by Ali-Yrkkö and Ylä-Anttila (1997) looks at the effects of the foreign direct in-
vestment of Finnish industrial firms on exports, production, and employment. The data 
used in the empirical analysis consist of the 30 largest industrial firms over the period 
1985 - 1995. The results show that, in the 1980s, foreign direct investment comple-
mented rather than replaced domestic investment, while, in the 1990s, foreign produc-
tion started to replace domestic production. However, their study does not directly link 
these international developments to labour markets. In addition, the data only consists of 
the largest industrial firms, and labour demand is more flexible in small and medium-
sized firms than in large firms. This study is, then, the first to estimate labour-demand 
elasticities using data from the Finnish manufacturing sector and the first to determine 
the impact of economic integration on labour-demand elasticities. 
 
5.1  Estimation strategy 
 
There are some issues to mention regarding the estimation strategy. One is the exogene-
ity of the regressors in equations (3.1) - (3.4). As Hamermesh (1986) discusses, some of 
them might actually be endogenous variables because firms make their output and factor 
demand decisions jointly. Quandt and Roser (1989) estimated an equilibrium model of 
the labour market, and used it to test the assumption of production exogeneity. They did 
not reject the assumption that production is exogenous. Furthermore, for the possibility 
of the endogeneity of investment the presence of capital market imperfections suggests 
that firms will find it difficult to adjust investment quickly in response to exogenous 
shocks that may influence employment decisions. If some regressors are endogenous, 
then least-squares parameter estimates will suffer an endogeneity bias, the net direction 
of which is unclear.45 On the other hand, and not only because of this potential problem, 
we estimate both of constant-output (constant-substitution) elasticities by using least 
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squares, and scale effect (substitution effect) elasticities by using controls as instruments 
and by supposing that production (investment) is endogenous. 
A second issue is that both labour demand and labour supply probably depend on 
wages, which raises the problem of identification when estimating equations (3.1) - 
(3.4). Therefore, it is not clear what combination of labour-demand and labour-supply 
elasticities is obtained by regressing labour quantities on labour prices.46 Hamermesh 
(1993) argues that individual firms usually face perfectly-elastic labour supplies. In 
other words, firms take exogenous wages as given, and choose employment. In contrast, 
the entire economy faces a perfectly-inelastic labour supply. At the level of the general 
economy wages are endogenously determined, and exogenous quantities are taken as 
given.47 In addition, Nickell and Symons (1990) have explained that the identification 
problem does not really exist anyway since labour supply and labour demand really 
depend upon two quite different real/nominal wages, one deflated labour costs by the 
producer price and one deflated net wages by the consumer price index. Although peo-
ples decisions take time to respond to changes in industry wages, while firms´ labour-
demand decisions do not, corresponding to labour supply at the national level, the la-
bour supply of an industry is supposed to be closer to perfectly elastic than perfectly 
inelastic.  If the identifying assumption of perfectly-elastic labour supply is violated 
then the estimated labour-demand elasticities will be biased upwards because of the 
                                                                                                                                               
45 Because the endogenous variable is correlated with the disturbance, the least squares estimators of the 
parameters of equations with endogenous variables on the right-hand side are inconsistent (see, e.g., 
Greene, 2000). 
46 Slaughter (2001) argues that industry elasticity and the national elasticity of labour demand are two 
conceptually distinct ideas. Both elasticities arise from the profit-maximizing input choices of firms. 
However, industry elasticity describes how the quantity of labour demanded by a single industry responds 
to a labour cost change which is exogenous to that industry. Leamer (2000) emphasized that national 
elasticity describes how endogenously determined national wages respond to an exogenous change in 
labour supply. A sufficiently diversified small, open economy may have a national labour demand that is 
infinitely elastic. For this economy a change in the national labour supply does not change national 
wages. Conversely, a large country producing a single product under a very flexible technology could 
have nearly infinite elasticities of labour demand at the industry level but a rather inelastic national elas-
ticity of labour demand. 
47 The converse of asking, as we have, what happens to the choice of inputs in response to an exogenous 
shift in a factor price is to ask what happens to factor prices in response to an exogenous change in factor 
supply. The elasticity of complementarity measures the percentage responsiveness of relative factor prices 
to a one percent change in factor supplies in the long run. (See Hamermesh 1986, p. 434.) 
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positive correlation between wages and labour supply.48 In short, we suppose that at the 
plant level the supply of labour is perfectly elastic. 
A third issue is that the calculated unit value of the average product wage is not the 
true marginal labour price. Because non-wage labour costs (e.g., training) are not incor-
porated into labour costs, the data contain measurement errors. Different firms employ 
different skill mixes within each labour group. Thus, different unit values might reflect 
different skill mixes rather than true differences in labour prices. Time differencing 
might mitigate the measurement error due to missing non-wage labour costs. 
Taking time differences would also control for unobserved time-invariant industry 
fixed effects which influence the labour-demand level. However, time-differencing can 
also aggravate regressor measurement errors and result in inconsistent estimates.49 To 
minimize this inconsistency, as Griliches and Hausman (1986) suggest, we estimate 
equations (3.1) - (3.4) using long differences - three-year and five-year differences. 
When attention is focused on trends over time in elasticities rather than on their levels, 
then the measurement bias might not influence decisively. Another advantage of longer 
differences is that over longer time horizons the maintained identifying assumption of 
perfectly-elastic labour supplies is more likely to hold.50 
Slaughter (2001), adopting a two-stage approach, regresses estimated elasticities on 
several plausible measures of international trade in the second stage. However, the theo-
retical model on which we base our empirical analysis has the feature of producing la-
bour-demand elasticities and determining the integration effects on those elasticities in 
single stage, so avoiding the econometric difficulties of two-stage procedures. One issue 
                                                 
48 If more than one theory is consistent with the some data, we have no way of determining which equilib-
rium of demand and supply is the right one. As a result, it is obvious that there will not be a solution, i.e. 
reduced form cannot be transformed back into a structure. Thus, the structure underlying the data is un-
der-identified. Because of this identification problem least squares will be biased. One technique is to use 
instrumental variables to overcome this problem, if there is a valid instrumental variable which is corre-
lated with the exogenous variables, but not with the error term. The data do not contain a valid instrumen-
tal variable that is plausibly included in the equation of labour supply, but excluded from the equation of 
labour demand, that can be used to shift labour supply along labour demand. The model is not estimable 
without restrictions, i.e. supposing that labour-supply elasticities shift with labour-demand elasticities. 
(See Greene, 2000, pp. 654-666.) 
49 Hsiao (1986) argues that if variables are indeed subject to measurement errors, exploiting panel data to 
control for the effects of unobserved individual characteristics using standard differenced estimators may 
result in even more biased estimates than simple OLS estimators using cross-sectional data alone. 
50 As Slaughter (2001) suggests, industry-specific skills obtained on the job might tend to make an indus-
try´s labour supply more inelastic. Longer time horizons should make this supply more elastic by allow-
ing people more opportunity to break these industry attachments. 
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is the fact that the dependent variable in a stage-two regression equation is estimated, 
not observed, which means that the error term is heteroskedastic. Supposing that eco-
nomic integration has influenced own-price labour-demand elasticities, it is necessary to 
determine elasticities during the process of integration, i.e. supporting the hypothesis of 
inter-time heterogeneous coefficients. To allow time-variation within elasticities over 
integration process, we estimate manufacturing-wide elasticities for each year from as 
far as 1975 through to 2002 using common intercepts over pooled plants. For equations 
(3.1) and (3.3), in order to estimate constant-output elasticities and constant-substitution 
elasticities we use a generalized least squares estimation (GLS); and for equations (3.2) 
and (3.4), in order to estimate scale effect elasticities and substitution effect elasticities 
we apply an instrumental variables estimation (G2SLS).51 In fact, we adopt a GLS esti-
mation procedure which allows for heteroscedasticity with cross section correlation.52 
 
5.2  Literature survey 
 
An interesting attempt to test for the labour market implications of changes in the de-
gree of openness is Slaughter (1997).53 Slaughters study (1997) is the first to estimate 
the time patterns for U.S. elasticities of labour demand and then correlate those esti-
mates with measures of international trade. The paper comes close to a direct test of the 
FPI-theorem. The idea behind the test is that, as the U.S. economy became more open 
from 1960 to 1991, the absolute elasticity of labour demand in individual industries 
should have become larger. Richardson and Khripounova (1998) also estimate the time 
pattern of U.S. labour demand elasticities, but their approach is patterned after Slaugh-
                                                 
51 By adopting a dynamic approach we also estimated elasticities specifying dynamics in terms of lags of 
the dependent variable and a distributed lag structure for the independent variables. However, it shown 
that the estimators for this dynamic approach perform worse than differenced estimators. The difficulty is 
that the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance, even if it is assumed that error term 
is not itself autocorrelated. 
52 Heteroskedasticity means that variances of the error terms are not constant across observations, but may 
arise with the value of observation. Thus, the estimators are not efficient. (See, e.g., Greene, 2000.) 
Anderson (1993) explains that controlling for heteroskedasticity would require weighting observations 
which estimated elasticities are relatively imprecise. The logic of weighted least squares (WLS) is that 
observations with smaller variances receive a larger weight and therefore have greater influence in the 
estimates; similarly, observations with greater variances receive a smaller weight and therefore have a 
smaller influence in the estimates (Greene 2000, p. 512). 
53 A later version of this paper was published (2001) in the Journal of International Economics. 
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ter´s regressions. Slaughters empirical work yields three main results. First, demand for 
production labour became more elastic in manufacturing overall and in five of eight 
industries. Second, the demand of non-production labour did not become more elastic in 
either manufacturing overall or in any of the eight industries. Third, the hypothesis that 
trade contributes to increased elasticities found mixed support, at best. The time series 
of the elasticities of labour demand are explained largely by a residual, time itself. 
Richardson and Khripounova (1998) search for linkages between the growing integra-
tion of U.S. markets with the global economy (determined by different trade concep-
tions) and the apparent decline in the market power of American workers (determined 
by the elasticity of labour demand). Their regressions follow, as closely as possible, the 
regressions of Slaughter. They consider not only production and non-production work-
ers, but also workers with different levels of education. The conclusion of their research 
is that from 1984 to 1991 growing global integration weakened the market power of 
less-skilled workers relative to more-skilled workers, and probably relative to employ-
ers. However, they did not find that globalization weakens the market power of more 
skilled workers. A similar methodology is applied by Faini et al. (1998) to Italy, with 
labour-demand elasticities estimated from the period 1985-1995, and in which 14 manu-
facturing industries are distinguished. They find weak support for the hypothesis that 
greater globalisation is associated with larger elasticities. Greenaway et al. (1999) 
evaluate the impact of trade volumes on employment through induced productivity 
changes, and the impact of trade changes on the slope of derived labour demand, intro-
ducing a term corresponding to interactions between the wage rate and import and ex-
port volumes. Adopting a dynamic labour demand framework for the UK, they find that 
import and export volumes had only a weak positive impact on labour-demand elasticity 
in manufacturing industries over the period 1979 to 1991. Adopting a different method-
ology and focusing on the intersectoral dimension of the scale effect of trade, Jean 
(2000) finds, for France, that openness can indeed have a significant effect on labour-
demand elasticities. 
Bruno et al. (2004) test the impact of globalisation on the elasticities of labour de-
mand using an industry-year panel for a number of industrialized countries including 
major European countries, Japan and the U.S. over the period 1970-1996. They focus on 
evaluating the substitution effect of trade by estimating a dynamic specification. Overall 
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they did not find any significant effect of trade on labour demand elasticity. The only 
exception is France, which seems to confirm the findings of Jean (2000). Andersen et al. 
(2001) estimate time varying employment relations in the manufacturing sector for EU 
countries over the period 1970 to 1999. Their empirical analysis of employment takes 
explicitly into account the fact that international integration changes the elasticity of 
labour demand. The empirical model is non-structural in the sense that the factors that 
potentially cause elasticities over time cannot be identified. They suppose that the vari-
ous channels of integration have qualitatively different effects on the elasticity of em-
ployment, i.e. the effects acting via product markets and via possibilities for outsourcing 
may run in an opposite directions in respect to the level of employment. Their prelimi-
nary results support the approach of not treating the parameters of labour demand as 
constant. 
The experience of dramatic changes in trade regimes of a number of developing 
countries might be thought the appropriate context for investigating the link between 
openness and the elasticity of labour demand. This approach is followed by Krishna et 
al. (2001), Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000), Hasan et al. (2007), and Haouas and 
Yagoubi (2004). Krishna et al. (2001) test the impact of trade liberalization on the elas-
ticities of labour demand using plant-level data from the Turkish manufacturing indus-
try for the years 1983-1986. Turkey´s 1984 import liberalization program significantly 
reduced both tariff and non-tariff barriers. They use the volume of import, estimates of 
protection (tariff and non-tariff) change, and Levinsohns (1993)54 estimates of mark-up 
changes as basic measures of trade liberalization. The results suggest that the linkage 
between greater trade openness and labour demand elasticities may be empirically quite 
weak. Furthermore, Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000) found here were no consistent pat-
terns and only very mixed support for the idea that trade liberalization has an impact on 
own wage elasticities. They use dynamic panel techniques to estimate labour demand 
functions for manufacturing establishments in Chile, Columbia and Mexico. Hasan et al. 
(2007) use various specifications, constant-output, constant-capital, and partial-
                                                 
54 Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) use firm-level data to study how trade liberalization affects the 
competitiveness of the product market in manufacturing. Levinsohn (1993) finds using Turkish data from 
1983 to 1986 that after trade liberalization, the demand of product market became more elastic. Using a 
panel of manufacturing firms in the Ivory Coast, Harrison (1994) presents evidence that the impact of 
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adjustment labour-demand models, and their various meaningful combinations, using 
industry-level data disaggregated by states from 1980 to 1997. They find a positive im-
pact of trade liberalization on labour-demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing 
sector. Furthermore, they find that these elasticities are not only higher for states with 
more flexible labour regulations but also larger impacted by trade reforms. Haouas and 
Yagoubi (2004) investigate the effects of trade liberalization on the elasticities of labour 
demand using data from 1971 to 1996 for manufacturing industries in Tunisia. Their 
results show only weak support for the idea that openness will lead to an increase in 
elasticities. However, the results are more robust to the type of labour, contract and 
permanent labour, which supports the conclusion that, through liberalization, the labour 
markets of Tunisia have become more flexible. 
Revenga (1992), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Borjas and Ramey (1995), Driffill et 
al. (1998), Burda (1999), Boeri et al. (2000), and Haffner et al. (2000) do not focus on 
the elasticities of labour demand, but they do address how the competitiveness of prod-
uct markets affect wages and/or employment. Revenga (1992) investigates the effect of 
increased import competition on U.S. manufacturing employment and wages using data 
on a panel of manufacturing industries over the period 1977-1987. The empirical analy-
sis uses industry import price data and an instrumental variables estimation strategy. 
The estimates suggest that changes in import prices have a significant effect on both 
employment and wages. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) study how international price 
competition affects negotiated wage settlements and employment. Their data include a 
sample of Canadian collective bargaining agreements from 1965 to 1983. They con-
clude that standard estimates of rent-sharing based on contract data seriously understate 
the impact of product market competition on negotiated wage settlements. Borjas and 
Ramey (1995) study how foreign competition reduces firms´ power in the product mar-
ket and thus labour rents. They propose that the impact of foreign competition on the 
relative wages of less skilled workers depends on the market structure of the industry 
penetrated. Their empirical evidence indicates that employment changes in a small 
group of trade-impacted concentrated industries can explain not only part of the aggre-
gate rise in wage inequality in the United States, but also some of the differences in the 
                                                                                                                                               
liberalization on competition leads to biased estimates of the relationship between trade reform and pro-
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trends in wage inequality overall. Driffill et al. (1998) investigate how a reduction in 
non-tariff barriers effects on wages using a cross-section of UK manufacturing data set 
from the 1990s. They suggest that when economies become more integrated through the 
removal of tariffs and other barriers to trade - resulting in an increase in competition in 
product markets - there should be some effect on wage and employment outcomes in the 
labour market, particularly where unions are active. Their results show that a reduction 
in non-tariff barriers from a high to a medium level appears to have a negative effect on 
wages, both for unionized and non-unionized establishments; the effect is particularly 
pronounced for unskilled workers. Burda (1999) surveys the effects of EMU on the 
functioning of labour and product markets and the relative importance of real and nomi-
nal rigidities using 1961-1996 data. He finds empirical evidence of both increasing 
nominal rigidities and decreasing real rigidities within EMU countries. The results sup-
port the theory that real rigidities in labour markets will come under increasing pressure 
from integration. Boeri et al. (2000) identify the impact of the changing profile of prod-
uct and labour market regulations on employment across OECD countries. They con-
struct regulation indicators, such as employment protection and barriers to trade and 
investment, for the period 1982-1995. They find that countries with restrictive product 
market regulation and tight employment protection legislation tend to have lower em-
ployment rates. In particular, stronger integration in the EU area does not seem to have 
been associated with convergence in respect to labour market institutional features such 
as employment protection, collective bargaining, and the size and structure of social 
benefits. Haffner et al. (2000) investigate whether European market integration, compe-
tition policies and EMU provide a sufficient incentive for member countries to intro-
duce greater competition into their economies and thus make labour markets more 
flexible. They use indicators such as the convergence of price structures, profit margin 
trends, and the degree of product and labour market regulation using data from the past 
two decades. They find evidence that both product market competition and labour mar-
ket flexibility have been fostered by integration. However, there is still considerable 
scope for increasing competitive pressures within the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
ductivity growth. Neither study links these developments of product market to labour markets. 
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5.3  Estimation results 
 
Our estimated elasticities of labour demand, both for total labour and for the two types 
of labour (production and non-production) are presented in figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 and 5.5. 
The figures plot annual manufacturing-wide elasticities for each specification using 
three-year and five-year differencing. To represent better the underlying trends, as 
Slaughter (2001) proposes, the figures plot the three-year moving averages of the esti-
mated elasticities. The estimates seem very plausible and well estimated. For all specifi-
cations their estimates lies within the range of [-0.09, -0.80] that Hamermesh (1993) 
proposes as plausible based on his survey of the literature. Furthermore, all point esti-
mates are negative and statistically significant. Overall, unskilled labour is found, as 
expected, to have somewhat higher wage elasticities in absolute terms than skilled la-
bour. In addition, these patterns are very consistent across both the three-year and five-
year differenced specifications. 
Figures 5.1a, 5.1b and 5.1c present estimated constant-scale-return labour-demand 
elasticities for total labour, production labour and non-production labour. Figures 5.2a, 
5.2b and 5.2c present estimated scale effect labour-demand elasticities. The basic result 
is that labour demand became more elastic during integration. The constant-output elas-
ticities of total labour demand declined steadily - except during the deep depression of 
the early 1990s in Finland55 - to around -0.75. In addition, by using instruments we see 
that total labour demand became more elastic during the 1980s and 1990s. Unexpect-
edly, there is more relative growth in elasticities for non-production labour than for pro-
duction labour. Furthermore, we see that the own-price demand elasticities of both la-
bour types are underestimated. The difficulty is that the aggregation of labour inputs by 
the production function is an arbitrary description of technology. If the labour sub-
aggregates are not separable from non-labour inputs, one will underestimate own-price 
demand elasticities and infer that the two types of labour are greater price-substitutes 
that, in fact, they are.  
                                                 
55 Labour demand is more sensitive to the economic cycle than to the integration process during a deep 
depression. 
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Figure 5.1 Estimated constant-output labour-demand elasticity (3-year moving averages of 3-year and 5-
year differencing) estimates for total labour (a), production labour (b), and non-production labour (c). The 
specification is (3.1) 
itittittittit eYL +∆+Ψ∆+∆=∆ )ln()ln()ln()ln( βµωα . 
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Figure 5.2 Estimated scale-effect labour-demand elasticity (3-year MA of 3-year and 5-year differencing) 
estimates for total labour (a), production labour (b), and non-production labour (c). The specification is 
(3.2). 
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2a) Scale-effect elasticities of total labour demand
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Because of the problem of the separable of inputs, and thus underestimated elasticities, 
for both labour types I only assess the effects of integration on the elasticity of total la-
bour demand. The scale-effect labour-demand elasticity estimates express changes in 
product-market competitiveness working through the scale effect. In comparison to the 
constant-output elasticity estimates, the scale-effect elasticity estimates seem more plau-
sible and well estimated. According to the correlation squares ( R2 ), the GLS-estimator 
performs better overall, within and between by using instruments rather by supposing a 
constant scale return.56 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The extent to which scale-effect estimates do not explain the difference between constant-
output and the scale-effect labour-demand elasticity estimates for total labour. 
 
 
If both constant-output and the scale-effect elasticities of labour demand are consis-
tently estimated then the difference between them is an estimate of the scale effect. Fig-
ure 5.3 presents the extent to which estimates of the instruments provide indirect evi-
                                                 
56 For example, the R-sq (within) of last year (5-year differencing) for total labour demand is 0.3086 by 
using instruments and 0.1036 by assuming a constant scale effect. For brevity, not all R-sq (overall, 
within and between) and CHI-sq statistics for each year, each specification, total labour and both labour 
types, and both differencing are reported. In summary, some statistics for a few years, each specification, 
total labour, and 3-year differencing are provided in Appendix 1. 
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dence  i.e. decreasing unexplained differences - on the scale effects of integration on 
labour demand elasticity during the 1980s and 1990s. Although, our instruments may 
not adequately control for shifts in product-market demand, we note that the difference 
between constant-output and the scale-effect elasticities of labour demand closely corre-
sponds to an estimate of the scale effect57 during integration (except during a deep de-
pression). This result provides support for the hypothesis that economic integration has 
contributed to the increased elasticity of labour demand via scale effects. 
In figures 5.4a, 5.4b and 5.4c is presented estimated constant-substitution labour-
demand elasticities for total labour, production labour and non-production labour, and 
figures 5.5a, 5.5b and 5.5c present estimated substitution-effect labour-demand elastic-
ities. We see that there is growth in capital-constrained elasticities for all labour types 
during integration, although labour demand became less elastic during Finland´s deep 
depression. Constant-substitution and the substitution effect elasticities of total labour 
demand declined to around -0.4.  Unskilled labour is found, as expected, to have some-
what higher wage elasticities in absolute terms than skilled labour. Empirical studies 
usually point to a lower degree of substitution between skilled labour and capital than 
between unskilled labour and capital. The integration forces that change labour substi-
tutability by making labour less/more easily substituted with foreign factors of produc-
tion depend on complementarity between human capital and physical investment. Sur-
prisingly, and counter-intuitively, there is more relative growth in elasticities for skilled 
labour than for unskilled labour. Because of the problem of the separable of inputs, as 
discussed above, in the case of the gross substitution I only assess the substitution ef-
fects of integration on the elasticities of total labour demand. Under gross substitution 
between labour and capital labour demand should have a positive correlation with capi-
tal costs.58 For example, in specifications (3.1) and (3.2) the coefficient of gross elastic-
ity mainly has a positive and statistically significant sign for total labour demand. The 
substitution-effect labour-demand elasticity estimates express changes in international 
outsourcing working through the substitution effect.  
 
                                                 
57 For total labour demand the scale-effect estimates lie within the range of [0.26, 0.55], and they all are 
statistically significant. The positive sign of this coefficient shows that, in the short run, an increase in 
demand of outputs is associated with an increase in demand for all inputs. 
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4b Constant-substitution elasticities of production labour demand
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4c Constant-substitution elasticities of non-production labour demand
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Figure 5.4 Estimated constant-substitution labour-demand elasticity (3-year MA of 3-year and 5-year 
differencing) estimates for total labour (a), production labour (b), and non-production labour (c). The 
specification is (3.3) 
itittittit eKL +∆+∆=∆ )ln()ln()ln( χωρ . 
 
                                                                                                                                               
58 Conversely, in case of the complementarity, labour demand depends on capital costs negatively. 
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5a Substitution-effect elasticities of total labour demand
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5b Substitution-effect elasticities of production labour demand
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5c Substitution-effect elasticities of non-production labour demand
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Figure 5.5 Estimated substitution-effect labour-demand elasticity (3-year MA of 3-year and 5-year dif-
ferencing) estimates for total labour (a), production labour (b), and non-production labour (c). The speci-
fication is (3.4). 
 
 
 
 56 
In comparison to the constant-substitution elasticity estimates the substitution-effect 
elasticity estimates seem more plausible. According to the R2 s, the GLS-estimator per-
forms better overall, within and between by using instruments than supposing constant 
capital stock.59 
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Figure 5.6 The extent to which substitution-effect estimates do not explain the difference between con-
stant-substitution and substitution-effect labour-demand elasticity estimates for total labour. 
 
 
If both the constant-substitution and substitution-effect elasticities of labour demand 
are consistently estimated then the difference between them is an estimate of the substi-
tution effect. Figure 5.6 presents the extent to which estimates of the instruments pro-
vide indirect evidence of the substitution effects of integration on the elasticity of labour 
demand. Although our instruments may not adequately control for shifts in international 
outsourcing, we note that the difference between the constant-substitution and substitu-
tion-effect elasticities of labour demand closely approximated an estimate of the substi-
tution effect60 during integration (except during the late 1980s). This result provides 
                                                 
59 For example, the R-sq (within) of last year (5-year differencing) for total labour demand is 0.1078 by 
using instruments and 0.0255 by supposing constant capital stock. 
60 For total labour demand the substitution-effect estimates lie within the range of [0.045, 0.226], and they 
all are statistically significant. The positive sign of this coefficient shows that, in the short run, higher 
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support for the hypothesis that economic integration has contributed to increased elas-
ticities of labour demand via substitution effects. 
 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was twofold: to investigate the effects of economic integration 
on the elasticity of labour demand with own price by using a theoretical model, and to 
undertake the same investigation using empirical analysis. We build the theoretical 
framework for estimating the elasticities of labour demand and determining the effects 
of economic integration on those elasticities. Using a general theoretical model of intra-
industry trade, we analyzed how economic integration changes labour-demand elastic-
ity. The model captured both effect, running from product markets (the scale effects) 
and factor substitutions possibilities (the substitution effects), to the elasticity of labour 
demand. We showed that intensified trade competition increases labour-demand elastic-
ity, whereas better advantage from economies of scale decreases labour-demand elastic-
ity by decreasing the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products. If inte-
gration gives rise to an increase in input-substitutability and/or outsourcing activities, 
labour demand will become more elastic. 
We formulated an econometric model in order to determine whether European inte-
gration has changed the own-price elasticities of labour demand in Finland using data 
from the manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2002. We found that, over time, demand 
for total labour, production labour and non-production labour has become more elastic 
in manufacturing overall. However, it is shown that, unexpectedly, there has been more 
relative growth in elasticities for non-production labour than for production labour. Fur-
thermore, we noted that the own-price demand elasticities for both labour types are un-
derestimated. Because of problem of the separable of inputs, and thus underestimated 
elasticities for both labour types, we only assessed the effect of integration on elastic-
ities for total labour demand. If both the constant-output (constant-substitution) and 
scale-effect (substitution-effect) elasticities of labour demand were consistently esti-
                                                                                                                                               
demand for non-labour inputs induced by increased demand of outputs is associated with higher employ-
ment. 
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mated, then the difference between them is an estimate of the scale effect (substitution 
effect). We noted that the difference between the constant-output (constant-substitution) 
and scale-effect (substitution-effect) elasticities of labour demand closely approximated 
an estimate of the scale effect (substitution effect) during integration. These results pro-
vide support for the hypothesis that economic integration has contributed to the in-
creased elasticity of labour demand. 
Finally, the study points to a potentially interesting area for future research. One area 
for further research would be to extend the integration model to capture the effect of 
increasing labour-demand elasticities on wage formation and thus on structural unem-
ployment. Our findings raise important challenges for policy-making regarding eco-
nomic integration and the role of profit-sharing and labour productivity. 
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APPENDIX 1.  Some regression results for total labour demand 
 
Method (3-year differencing) Equation (3.1) GLS Equation (3.2) G2SLS Equation (3.3) GLS Equation (3.4) G2SLS 
3-year average: 1979 - 1981                 
Constant -0,111 (-8,69) -0,057 (-5,76) -0,268 (-27,9) 0,038 (7,67) 
Production 1  0,476 (72,9)     
Capital stock     1  0,096 (18,2) 
Capital costs 0,104 (2,37) 0,211 (6,26)     
Labour costs -0,561 (-42,7) -0,378 (-37,4) -0,308 (-13,2) -0,214 (-18,1) 
R² (within) 0,100  0,261  0,011  0,029  
CHI² 1834,32 [2] 5848,89 [3] 176,06 [2] 637,07 [3] 
3-year average: 1989 - 1991                 
Constant 0,003 (0,45) 0,008 (1,60) -0,253 (-25,2) -0,040 (-8,53) 
Production 1  0,417 (78,3)     
Capital stock     1  0,098 (20,8) 
Capital costs 0,149 (4,82) 0,058 (2,51)     
Labour costs -0,712 (-47,5) -0,464 (-42,9) -0,356 (-14,3) -0,269 (-20,5) 
R² (within) 0,159  0,377  0,018  0,065  
CHI² 2309,71 [2] 6898,37 [3] 205,48 [2] 820,54 [3] 
3-year average: 2000 - 2002                 
Constant -0,045 (-3,46) 0,012 (1,40) -0,047 (-3,76) 0,021 (2,89) 
Production 1  0,351 (43,4)     
Capital stock     1  0,100 (10,6) 
Capital costs 0,272 (1,73) 0,027 (0,33)     
Labour costs -0,728 (-25,0) -0,534 (-26,4) -0,422 (-11,2) -0,418 (-17,9) 
R² (within) 0,088  0,281  0,025  0,089  
CHI² 632,21 [2] 2325,41 [3] 127,47 [2] 433,97 [3] 
         
Notes: (1) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (2) Degrees of freedom are presented in square brackets.  
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III  Welfare Policies, Labour Taxation, Employment 
and Economic Integration: Econometric Evidence 
from European Countries 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
By using theoretical modelling and empirical analysis, we investigate how economic 
integration affects the impact of welfare policies on employment. We consider the vi-
ability of financing the public sector, i.e. public consumption and social security ex-
penses, by general labour taxation in an economy which has become more integrated 
into international product markets. Increasing job mobility implies a correction in the 
distortions arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour, which, 
in turn, affects the options open to policy-makers when pursuing welfare policies. The 
effects of economic integration on the impact of welfare policies on employment clearly 
depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of econo-
mies of scale. As increased trade competition crowds out better economies of scale, it 
becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by labour taxation. We test 
the idea of whether economic integration has changed the impact of welfare policies on 
employment in European countries using data from 1975 to 2004. Overall, the results 
provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that economic integration has contrib-
uted to the distortion effects of welfare policies on employment. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few years, the impact of economic integration both on the viability of 
maintaining an extended welfare state, especially in Northern European countries and 
on the labour market has attracted wide interest. One in concern is whether it will be-
come more difficult to maintain a large public sector and an extended social security 
system financed by general labour taxation. The cost of the extended welfare state in an 
internationally integrated economy may be a higher level of unemployment, via distor-
tions arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour factor. It has 
been argued that in an open economy set-up equilibrium employment might be affected 
by demand factors such as fiscal spending (see, e.g., Gatti 2002, p. 7). On the other 
hand, as Rodrik (1997, 1998a) and Andersen (2002) argue, economic integration may 
lead to more volatility and thus the increasing need for social insurance arrangements to 
ensure some income stability in the presence of cross-country shocks, uncertainty and 
risk-aversion. However, increasing job mobility implies a change in the distortions aris-
ing from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour, which affects the pos-
sibilities perceive in pursuing welfare policies. Thus, as Andersen (2003) argues, the 
need for social insurance arrangements may increase at the same time as it becomes 
more difficult to finance the system. This study addresses the second of these concerns: 
the problem of maintaining a welfare state financed by distortionary labour taxation 
while greater economic integration affects the impact of welfare policies on employ-
ment. 
Economic integration is a process in which the markets for goods and factors of pro-
duction tend to become perfectly integrated. The mobility of the production increases as 
a consequence of product market integration. As Rodrik (1998b, 2000) argues, open 
economies, which are free to trade with each other, differ from closed economies in 
respect to the fact that, in particular, capital and employers are internationally mobile. 
However, capital income taxation accounts for a relatively small proportion of total tax 
revenue in most European countries, which suggests that the mobility of certain tax 
bases does not play a major role in a country´s ability to finance welfare policies during 
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economic integration. On the other hand, during integration, product demand will be-
come more sensitive to price differentials between different countries, and firms loca-
tion decisions more responsive to relative labour costs. Therefore, competitiveness pres-
sure on the labour market towards greater flexibility is expected to increase under a re-
gime of diminishing trade barriers. Hence, it is more natural to address the question of 
how product market integration affects the consequences of a welfare state financed by 
general labour taxation, although workers are immobile. The impact of welfare policies 
on employment during a period of economic integration definitely depends on a trade-
off between intensified competition and better advantage of economies of scale. The 
progress of integration with the wider flow of trade and capital has been strengthening 
competition between EU countries, which has reflected in the link between wage forma-
tion and unemployment. With unionized labour markets, a permanent increase in labour 
income taxation leads unions to demand a higher real wage to compensate for the de-
creased post-tax income, and as a consequence of higher labour costs firms demand less 
labour.61 Hence, it can be argued that the ability of the welfare state to improve em-
ployment through fiscal activities is progressively reduced when product market compe-
tition increases, i.e. the optimal level of public spending decreases as a consequence 
of increased product market competition. On the other hand, with increased integration 
and competition, firms with access to the wider market are expected to be able to ex-
pand sales and production to take better advantage of economies of scale while continu-
ing to cover production costs despite lower price-cost margins. Thus, market power may 
arise from specialization in production and the differentiation of products in order to 
establish segmented markets. This might decrease the costs of maintaining welfare sys-
tems. Since product market elasticity with product prices is likely to rise with integra-
tion, this implies that, with greater trade openness, we should see, in turn, an increase in 
the cost of maintaining welfare systems. As increased trade competition crowds out 
better advantages from economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare 
systems financed by labour taxation. 
                                                 
61 In contrast to competitive labour markets, in the presence of unions the burden of labour taxation will 
be borne, in part, by employers and will therefore increase labour costs even if the labour supply is per-
fectly inelastic. The strength of the impact of increased labour income taxation on wages depends on how 
highly centralized union-government negotiations are, so as to internalize the effects of higher taxes on 
more public goods or higher transfers (see, e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Alesina and Perotti 1997). 
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The purpose of this study is to examine, using theoretical model and empirical analy-
sis, how economic integration affects the impact of welfare policies on employment. To 
consider this issue, we need first of all to clarify the effect of welfare state activities and 
labour taxation on wage formation and employment. Then we have to examine how 
these effects depend on how integrated the international product market is. In small 
open economies during international integration, the general point to stress is that the 
distorting effects of labour taxes survives during the adjustment, and, in fact, potentially 
worse distortions arise. In order to study this issue we use a model with three main 
characteristics. First, we propose an open economy with two sectors: a tradable sector 
and a public sector. Second, we suppose that labour markets are unionized, which gen-
erates rigidities in the wage setting process. The third feature is that we assume that dif-
ferentiated goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. While the effects 
of economic integration can work through many different channels, product markets and 
factor substitution, in this study economic integration is mainly associated with market 
power, which makes it possible to capture the main quality effects in a manageable way. 
Finally, our empirical aim is to determine whether European integration has changed the 
impact of welfare policies on employment. This is tested using data from European 
countries from 1975 to 2004. 
The study is organized as follows: section 2 develops a theoretical model for empiri-
cal analysis. It specifies some basic mechanisms that determine how increased integra-
tion affects the impact of welfare policies on the employment. Section 3 formulates the 
econometric model while the data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the es-
timation strategy, and reports on the empirical results. The last section concludes the 
study. 
 
2  THE THEORY 
 
2.1  A Two-sector model 
 
We consider an open economy with two sectors, a trading private sector and non-trading 
public sector. There are many firms n in the private sector producing tradable differenti-
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ated products with capital and labour as inputs. We suppose that there is another sector: 
a public sector producing non-tradable goods solely for the domestic market. Assuming 
that product markets are imperfectly competitive, there is monopolistic competition in 
tradable good markets adapting the model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The structure of 
this model is such that consumers demand a variety of differentiated tradable products 
and non-tradable public goods. Representative consumer's tastes are assumed to be rep-
resented by the utility function 
 
(2.1) GdLDbV T +−= θ
θ
1  
 
where ∑
=
=
n
i
iDD
1
 is an index of the consumption of differentiated tradable products, G 
is the consumption of public sector goods, b  is the positive constant, and d captures the 
disutility of work TL . Consumers supply labour from which they receive a wage income 
if employed, and unemployment benefits if unemployed.62  Each consumer maximises 
their utility function (2.1) subject to their budget constraint. The budget constraint sim-
ply requires that the value of expenditure is not more than the value of income: 
TRIDP +=*  where TR is lump-sum transfers from the government, I labour income, 
and *P  an index of the price level in terms of international integration. Labour income 
is wtI w )1( −=  if employed, and I = s if unemployed where wt  is the wage tax rate, and 
s is unemployment benefit. 
By imposing the symmetry assumption consumer maximizing will give us 
 
(2.2) 
θ−
−






=
1
1
*
b
PD  
 
 
                                                 
62 Note that d can be interpreted as a reservation wage, i.e. for any after tax wage above d the consumer 
inelastically supplies their working time (normalized to unity), which is a reasonable approximation of the 
fact that labour supply elasticity is usually found to be small. 
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where 1
1
1
>
−
=
θ
ε  is the product-demand elasticity in tradable good markets. There is 
an industry level description of the above solution (equation 2.2) on page 22. The de-
mand for product type i  for the private sector is given as 
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where ip  represents the price of variety i with 1>φ  denoting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two product types (see Helpman and Krugman 1989). The above 
equation (2.3) is explained at the industry level in Chapter 2.2 of essay II. 
Based on the theory used in essay II, the effects on imperfectly competitive product 
markets of increased integration via declining trade costs are basically of two counter-
acting sorts (see pages 23 and 24). First, individual producers with access to the wider 
market are expected to be able to expand production to take better advantage of econo-
mies of scale, i.e. 0>∂
∂
∂
∂
τ
φ a
a
. Second, with increased integration and competition, 
firms market share becomes increasingly sensitive to price changes, raising the elastic-
ity of the consumption price i.e. 0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
τ
ε n
n
. In the imperfect competition, we then have 
the condition of the pricing rule for product types  
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In optimum, price equals marginal revenue from exporting, where relative trade costs 
equal to mark-up factor, i.e. 
1
1
−+
+
=
+
εφ
εφτ
a
 (see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1989, 
p. 18). For tradable good markets, we summarize the characterization of the optimal 
pricing rule in 
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Proposition  1  Lower trade costs with increased integration, a higher number of firms 
and, in consequence, a higher elasticity of product demand will reduce the mark-up 
price, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, a lower 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will raise it, ceteris paribus. 
 
The government provides public goods and social security in the form of transfers re-
lated to unemployment, and other lump-sum subsidies. Public demand for product vari-
ety j is associated with the price index for the non-tradable domestic market by 
ξ
ξ
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=
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1
 where the over score ¯ indicates the public sector. The government 
faces a downward sloping public demand curve 
 
(2.5) ξ−= pG  
 
where ξ  is the demand elasticity of public goods, implying that public demand for 
product variety j can be written 
 
(2.6) 
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Note that this way of specifying public consumption, as Andersen (2003) argues, rules 
out relative demand shifts between public and private consumption as a source of rela-
tive price changes.63 We assume, for simplicity, that there is no tax on capital, and that 
unemployment benefit is non-taxable income. Hence, taxes are only levied on labour, 
capturing the empirical fact that general labour taxation (wage tax rate wt  and social 
security contributions pt )  accounts for the majority of public sector revenue. Let N be 
the labour force, TL  total employment (employment in the private and public sectors) 
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and [N  TL ] the number of unemployed. Then we can write the budget constraint of 
government as: 
 
(2.7) TTT LwtSTRGP =++ )(  
 
where Tw  refers total wage rates, TR is the total expense of transfers, and S = s(N  TL ) 
is the total expense of unemployment benefits. Consequently, the labour tax rates 
)( pw
T ttt +≡  are endogenous, adjusted so as to balance the budget. 
In small open economies going through a process of international integration, the 
general point to stress is that the distorting effects of labour taxes survive during the 
adjustment, and, in fact, potentially worse distortions arise. In the tradable private sec-
tor, a firm considers the gross wage of private sector w~  as a given consisting of the net-
of-tax wage64  plus social security contributions pt , so that wtw p )1(~ += . For example, 
an increase in employers social security contributions shifts the labour demand curve 
inward by increasing the cost of labour (see, e.g., Pissarides 1998). As Holmlund et al. 
(1989) explain, if there is complete nominal wage rigidity, employment takes on the 
whole burden of adjustment.65 Assuming that linear-homogenous technology can be 
represented in the private sector by the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) produc-
tion function form, it can be specified as 
 
(2.8) [ ]ϕϕϕ 1KLY +=  
  
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is defined 0
1
1 ≥
−
≡
ϕ
σ , 
and capital is denoted by K. Elasticity of substitution is defined as the effect of a change 
                                                                                                                                               
63 Since we are considering the distortion effects of welfare activities, this assumption simplifies to isolate 
the direct effects, disregarding any relative price effects that may arise if the distribution of income affects 
aggregate demand. 
64 A rise in wage tax increases labour costs when the rise of wage tax is compensated for by an increase in 
the negotiated wages. 
65 If there is, correspondingly, complete nominal wage flexibility, the increase in social security contribu-
tions is completely shifted back on to wages. 
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in relative factor prices on the relative inputs of these two factors, holding output con-
stant (see Allen 1938, or Hamermesh 1993). Conditional labour costs can be derived as 
 
(2.9) 
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Yw . 
 
Using (2.3) under the utility maximization of an individual consumer, i.e. set marginal 
utility equal to marginal cost, each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve 
 
(2.10) )()( εφ +−== ppDY . 
 
where ε  is product-demand elasticity, and φ  the elasticity of substitution between any 
two product types. The closer substitutes for output Y  are on the international market 
the more elastic output demand becomes. Profit maximization implies that firms will set 
a price which exceeds the marginal cost by a constant mark-up factor, i.e. 1
1
>
−+
+
εφ
εφ
 
(see page 28). Under the assumption of wage taking behaviour, labour demand can be 
written using equations (2.9) and (2.10) 
 
(2.11) σεφ −+−= wpL ~)( . 
 
The labour market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive. It is commonly ac-
cepted that the monopoly union model (see, e.g., Booth 1995) captures, in a simple way, 
the qualitative implications of different labour market models, at least in respect to the 
generation of unemployment and in the wage response to wage income taxation and the 
degree of centralization. Wages are set by trade unions, and it is assumed that a union is 
large enough to be able to negotiate over wages, but small enough to take welfare policy 
as a given. Unions maximize the income of their members subject to the labour demand 
function (2.11). A unions objective function is given by  
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(2.12) sLNwtL w )()1( −+−=Ω . 
 
The maximization of (2.12) with respect to the wage rate yields the equation for the 
equilibrium wages 
 
(2.13) 
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where 
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
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LLη   is the elasticity of labour demand with wages. For simplicity, in 
the present setting, unemployment benefits are not taxable income.66 When considering 
how wages respond to changes in welfare activities, we find that for unemployment 
benefits there is both a direct effect in terms of raising the reservation wage of workers, 
0>
∂
∂
s
w , and an indirect effect in terms of raising the tax rate, 0>
∂
∂
wt
w . These results 
return the standard result (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997) that an increase in public 
sector activities leads to wage increases. For simplicity, in the present setting, it is as-
sumed that a trade union will be small enough to take welfare policy as a given. But 
how weak is the strength of a union´s impact on wages depends on how highly central-
ized union-government negotiations are to internalize the effects of higher taxes on the 
volume of public goods or higher transfers (see, e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988). As 
Summers et al. (1993) suggest, one may conjecture that if wage setting is centralised 
and workers are represented by a very large trade union, they are likely to develop a 
more moderate attitude in negotiations, and the union will take into account the budget-
ary implications of unemployment subsidies.67 Wage increases would thus be set at a 
                                                 
66 It is well-known that the effect of unemployment benefits on wage formation depends on whether un-
employment benefits are taxes by the same rate as wages or not (Pissarides 1998). Furthermore, labour 
tax systems are progressive in European countries, although for simplicity we assume that a labour tax 
system is proportional. As we do not consider here the effects of tax reform, comparative statics for a 
labour tax rate change are independent of whether we consider a proportional or progressive labour tax 
system. Raising unemployment subsidies permanently has the same qualitative effect as a higher labour 
tax: wages increase and employment falls. 
67 Summers et al. (1993) define centralised wage setting as unions ability to perceive the government 
budget constraint, i.e. to be aware of a linkage between taxes and benefits received. They suggest that 
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lower level. As trade unions are large enough to set wages, but not large enough to ne-
gotiate over welfare policy with the government, this implies that when looking at the 
empirical determinants of employment, countries might be divided into groups accord-
ing to the pattern of wage negotiations. 
A key parameter for wage rates between sectors is the elasticity of labour demand. 
There is a qualitative difference between the private and public sectors, since the latter 
has the possibility of partly passing on an increase in wages to prices, while this is not 
possible in the former case. Hence, we assume that labour demand is less elastic in the 
public sector, compared with tradable firms in private sector. We have then the condi-
tion of wage rule for both sectors 
 
(2.14) 
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The condition takes into account the fact that the competitive pressure is higher in 
traded firms, and therefore wages may not be higher in the private sector than in the 
public sector. Rodrik (1997) argues that since the demand for labour is a derived de-
mand, which varies proportionately with the elasticity of demand for goods, the integra-
tion of goods markets alone makes the demand for domestic labour more elastic because 
of declining mark-ups. Therefore, with heightened foreign competition the unions face 
more elastic labour demand relation and thus moderate their wage demands ( 0<
∂
∂
LL
w
η
). 
Huizinga (1993), and Danthine and Hunt (1994), for example, find that the creation of 
firm level competition increases the elasticity of labour demand, which moderates un-
ions` wage demands, i.e. increased goods market competition leads to lower wages and 
thus to higher employment. However, the effect of integration on the price sensitivity of 
market share may be compensated for by its direct effect on market share, i.e. market 
power can arise from specialization in production and differentiation of products in or-
der to take better advantage of economies scale with segmented markets. Nickell et al. 
(1994) and Stewart (1990) find evidence of a positive (time series) relationship between 
                                                                                                                                               
labour taxation is less distorting with respect to labour supply decisions in countries with more centralised 
wage bargaining. 
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wages and market share. This suggests that both the sharing of mark-ups and higher 
wages are associated with the market. We summarize the effects of integration on wages 
for private sector in 
 
Proposition  2  With increased integration lower trade costs, a higher number of firms 
and, in consequence, an increase in the elasticity of product demand ( 0<∂
∂
∂
∂
τ
ε n
n
) will 
increase the elasticity of labour demand ( 0>
∂
∂
ε
ηLL ) and thus decrease wage pressure 
( 0<
∂
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LL
w
η
), whereas better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, a 
lower elasticity of substitution between differentiated products ( 0>∂
∂
∂
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τ
φ a
a
) will de-
crease labour-demand elasticity ( 0>
∂
∂
φ
ηLL ) and thus increase wages ( 0<∂
∂
LL
w
η
). 
 
Taking the equilibrium wage rate as (2.13) and labour costs wtw p )1(~ += , we have 
equilibrium employment for traded sector using equation (2.11) 
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We see that an increase in the elasticity of product demand triggered by more firms (i.e. 
ε  rises) decreases labour demand ( 0<
∂
∂
ε
L ). Product demand becomes more price elas-
tic when product markets are more integrated, but is the effect of product market inte-
gration on the price sensitivity of market share larger than its direct effect on market 
share? For example, individual firms with access to the wider market might be able to 
expand sales and production taking better advantage of economies scale (i.e. φ  falls), 
which can be associated with decreased market imperfections and thus increased labour 
demand ( 0<
∂
∂
φ
L ). Furthermore, when unions face a more elastic labour demand rela-
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tion and thus moderate their wage demands ( 0<
∂
∂
LL
w
η
), we find that increased labour-
demand elasticity increases labour demand ( 0>
∂
∂
LL
L
η
) due to the reduced market power 
of unions. Accordingly, if unions are less aggressive in passing on increases in wage tax 
and unemployment benefits to wages implying better employment, this suggests that 
economic integration may imply an implicit structural reform of labour markets through 
its effect on union market power. However, as Andersen (2003) argues, even though 
international integration may reduce the distortionary effects of unemployment benefits 
and taxation on wage formation it does not necessarily follow that the distortionary ef-
fects on employment are reduced. In addition, during the process of integration, interna-
tional trade can increase the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. As 
Rodrik (1997) argues, the increasing mobility of capital means that the demand for la-
bour will generally be more responsive to changes in factor prices. Firms can substitute 
other factors of production for immobile workers more easily by investing. We find 
that, as a consequence of decreased trade costs as substitutability increases (i.e. σ  
rises), labour demand becomes more sensitive to labour costs. Hence, despite wage 
moderation, the effect of employment may become larger because tighter integration 
increases the sensitivity of employment to wage costs. We summarize the characteriza-
tion of the impact of economic integration on distortionary employment effects in 
 
Proposition  3  During the process of economic integration as increased trade competi-
tion crowds out better advantage of economies of scale, 
τ
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, and the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labour increases, 0<∂
∂
τ
σ
, the less centralized 
the wage formation process is, the larger the distortionary effects of welfare policies on 
employment are. 
 
Consider now equilibrium employment in the non-traded public sector. Similarly, for 
public sector it follows 
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We can see that, in this framework, economic integration does not affect public em-
ployment either via the scale effects of integration or through increasing labour-demand 
elasticity. Furthermore, in the non-traded sector, it is possible partly to pass on an in-
crease in wages to prices, while this is not possible in the traded sector ( εξ < ). How-
ever, public consumption, which improves public sector employment68 is able to affect a 
firms competitiveness via labour taxation (the distortion), which finances increased 
expenditure (using the budget constraint of government (2.7)). The impact of increased 
public expenditure on international competitiveness results from the negative effects of 
labour taxes on disposable income. The loss of competitiveness from higher labour 
costs causes a reduction in the demand for exports and a fall in private employment. 
This means that if an increase in wage taxes is compensated for by higher wages, or an 
increase in employers social security payments causes an increase in labour costs, eco-
nomic integration worsens the ability of a government to improve employment through 
welfare policy when competition crowds out public consumption. Besides, in the non-
traded sector, an increase in labour taxation and no cuts in public sector wages partly 
replace the positive impact of the consumption of public sector goods on public sector 
employment ( 0>
∂
∂
G
L ) through the opposing effect of higher labour costs ( 0~ <∂
∂
w
L ), de-
pending on how centralized the labour market is. It is less costly to maintain welfare 
activities, if labour markets are highly centralized.69 
In summary, increasing job mobility implies a correction in the distortions arising 
from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour, which affects the possi-
bilities perceive in pursuing certain welfare policies, i.e. public spending and social se-
curity expenses, in an economy which is becoming more integrated into the interna-
tional product market. The effects of economic integration on the impact of welfare 
                                                 
68 The government demands labour to produce public goods. This captures the fact that for most coun-
tries, as Andersen (2001) explains, employment constitutes the major part of public consumption, and 
wage costs are the dominant expenditure item. 
69 Empirical support for the importance of this mechanism has recently been provided by Alesina and 
Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
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policies on employment clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition 
and better advantage of economies of scale. As increased trade competition crowds out 
better economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed 
by labour taxation. 
 
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
Our empirical aim is to test whether economic integration has changed the impact of 
welfare policies on employment by looking at a panel of European countries. Our strat-
egy is to take the theoretical model in Section 2 as the basis for econometric identifica-
tion. In particular, we use the equilibrium conditions for employment in the traded and 
non-traded sector. Let itl  be the employment rate in country i and time t. Taking a linear 
approximation of equations (2.15) and (2.16) aggregate employment for each period can 
be written as a regression function 
 
(3.1) ititititwitit egtrytl it +++++= )()()()()( χρβµωα  
 
where ω is the real price of labour, wt  the wage-based tax rate, y the real GDP index, tr 
the ratio of government transfers to GDP, and g the ratio of government wage-based 
consumption to GDP. The error terms are denoted e. By supposing that scale returns are 
constant we estimate the constant-output labour price of employment using a restricted 
least squares procedure, 1=β  with a constant output.70 By estimating levels, it is as-
sumed that there are no significant time lags between the changes of labour prices and 
the employment responses. Hamermesh (1983) reports that typical adjustment lags are 
six months to one year, so in the annual data, lags should not be too important at the 
country level. 
By supposing that scale returns are not constant we estimate the non-constant-output 
coefficients of the labour price. If both scale and constant-output labour prices are con-
                                                 
70 In the short run, changes in the costs of labour will induce a change in output, i.e. the estimates of la-
bour price include the scale effects. The short run labour price would be estimated without production 
measurement or with output as constant. (See, e.g., Hamermesh 1986, p. 449.) 
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sistently estimated, then the difference between them is the estimate of the scale effect, 
and it would provide indirect evidence on the competitiveness of product markets. Thus, 
the impact of integrations scale effects on the impact of welfare policies on employ-
ment can be determined by controlling demand factors. To estimate the scale effect la-
bour price of employment for each period suggests the following regression equation 
 
(3.2) ititititwitit ugtrytl it +++++Φ= )()()()()( χρβµω  
 
Here u is the error term. The scale effect β  measures the impact of international de-
mand shocks on employment. We use two different instrument variables: the share of 
countrys i exports to the other EU-countries in production and the share of the coun-
trys i output of the European Union in production. These variables are deflated by a 
price competitiveness indicator. The first attempts to measure foreign demand for a 
countrys products, and the second attempts to measure the overall demand in the Euro-
pean Union. Furthermore, a price competitiveness indicator measures international 
product market competition. 
To measure the degree of labour markets centralisation, we use indexes constructed 
by OECD Jobs Study (1994) for coverage ratio, Golden (1996) for union density, and 
Nickell (1997) for co-ordination. These are reported in Table 4.1. These indexes rank 
EU-countries in order of centralisation. We partition countries in three groups71: the 
NOR-group includes Scandinavian countries and Austria, where trade unions are large 
and centralised; the CON-group includes countries (except Austria) in continental 
Europe, where unions play an important role but are decentralised; and the BRIT-group 
includes Ireland and the United Kingdom, where labour markets are quite competitive. 
We allow the wage-based tax-rate coefficient to vary across these groups of EU-
countries by multiplying wt  by three dummy variables taking a value of unity if the 
country belongs to the group and zero otherwise. The focus of the analysis is on the 
consequences of taxation, not on the composition of spending. Kiander et al. (2004) 
notice that there is a strong positive correlation between centralization and public con-
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sumption: unionization tends to raise public consumption. Using the degree of centrali-
zation in wage bargaining in order to classify the countries we proximate general cate-
gorization of countries. 
 
Table 4.1 Coverage, density and co-ordination of labour relations in EU-countries. 
 
Country Union Density Union Coverage 
Index 
Co-ordination: 
Union 
Co-ordination: 
Employer 
NOR-group     
Austria 46.2 3 3 3 
Denmark 71.4 3 3 3 
Finland 72.0 3 2 3 
Sweden 82.5 3 3 3 
CON-group     
Belgium 51.2 3 2 2 
France 9.8 3 2 2 
Germany 32.9 3 2 3 
Greece     
Italy 38.8 3 2 2 
Luxembourg     
Netherlands 25.5 3 2 2 
Portugal 31.8 3 2 2 
Spain 11.0 3 2 1 
BRIT-group     
Ireland 49.7 3 1 1 
United Kingdom 39.1 2 1 1 
Notes: (1) Coverage measures the extent to which contracts signed by organised unions extend to the rest 
of the labour force. (2) Density measures the rates of net union density, i.e., the number of union members 
net of pensioners divided by the labour force. (3) Co-ordination measures the extent of contracting co-
ordination within different union and employers organisations. The index provides a qualitative ranking 
of countries: 1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high. 
 
Sources: OECD Jobs Study (1994), Nickell (1997), and Golden (1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
71 This classification has been suggested by several previous studies (Blanchard 1997, Bruno and Sachs 
1985, Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Cameron 1984, Daveri and Tabellini 2000, Layard et al. 1991, Nickell 
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4  DATA 
 
The employment equations are estimated using panel data of European countries72 
based on statistics from OECD database sources: the OECD Statistics of International 
Trade, OECD Taxing Wages Statistics, the OECD Productivity Database, OECD Na-
tional Accounts Statistics, and the OECD Economic Outlook Database. The panel data 
covers years from 1975 to 2004. Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of the observa-
tions. Estimation requires measures of employment, the real labour price, labour taxa-
tion, government transfers, government consumption and real production for all coun-
try-year observations. The deflating variable is a producer price index. The employment 
rate comes directly from the OECD Economic Outlook Database as the share of work-
ers in the labour force. The real average labour price is constructed as a unit labour cost 
equalling nominal annual wages plus social security costs paid by employers deflated by 
the producer price index and divided by the number of workers. Employment is as-
sumed to correlate negatively with labour costs. The higher the labour price is, the 
slighter labour demand is. The labour tax rate includes direct average taxation plus so-
cial security payments paid by employees divided by total wages. We expect real wages 
to increase with the labour tax rate. This effect will be small, if labour markets are 
highly centralised, and thus the negative impact of a higher labour tax rate on employ-
ment will also be small. If trade unions play an important role in wage negotiations, but 
are not centralised enough to take into account the repercussions of higher wages, we 
expect the negative effect on employment to be large. The cross-sectional variation in 
employment rates is dominated by fixed effects at the country level. Although labour 
market legislation differs markedly across countries, it has not changed much since the 
1970s (Nickell, 1997). Thus, as Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argue, the correlation be-
tween labour taxes and employment is only captured by simultaneously exploiting time 
series and cross-country variations of the data, and by distinguishing among countries 
on the basis of their labour market institutions. 
                                                                                                                                               
and Layard 1999). 
72 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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The data for government expenditure is based on OECD National Accounts Statis-
tics. The ratio of government transfers to GDP includes public expenditure on unem-
ployment subsidies and other social transfers. It is generally supposed that the unem-
ployment benefits decrease employment. However, the evidence of Nickell and Layard 
(1999) suggests that unemployment benefits have little impact on overall labour input. 
While high benefits lead to high unemployment, they also lead to high participation 
because they make participation in the labour market more attractive because participa-
tion is necessary in order to be eligible for high benefits. This is consistent with the 
weak impact of unemployment benefit on the employment ratio because the higher un-
employment effect and higher labour market participation effect tend to cancel each 
other out. It is not clear whether the size of the net effect also depends on trade union 
strength and centralisation, since even in competitive labour markets higher replacement 
rates could have a large effect on employment through individual search or bargaining 
attitudes. Finally, we also expect that the employment rate depends on ratio of govern-
ment wage-based consumption to GDP positively. Although public consumption, which 
improves public employment, is able to affect a countrys competitiveness via the fact 
that increasing distortions of labour taxation finance increased expenditures. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Variable summary statistics. 
 
Variable      Obs          Mean      Std. Dev.      Min          Max 
GDP-index (real)     450          76.12        18.69        28.02        118.2 
Employment rate     450          92.97        3.698  81.56        99.82 
Labour price (real)     450          73.58        28.07  2.670        116.9 
Labour tax rate      450          17.38        10.07        0.040        44.39 
Ratio of transfers (real)     450          0.226        0.112        0.007        0.499 
Ratio of public consumption (real)    450          0.143        0.066        0.009        0.388 
Exports share (real)     450          0.016        0.015  0.0001      0.083 
EU-output share (real)     450          0.067        0.093  0.0003      0.687 
 
 
For equation (3.2), we use two different instrument variables: the share of countrys 
exports to other EU-countries in production and the share of the countrys output of 
European Union in production deflated by that countrys price competitiveness indica-
tor. Both of countrys exports to other EU-countries and the price competitiveness indi-
cator are based on OECD Foreign Trade Statistics. The other instrument variable, the 
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total production of the European Union, is based on OECD National Accounts Statis-
tics. The real GDP index, another of the endogenous variables, comes directly from the 
data of productivity. A rise in exports increases a countrys production, which should 
increase employment. In theory, labour demand is supposed to depend on the output 
positively. If product demand rises and thus production increases, firms demand for 
factors rises. The assumption is that higher exports signal better economies of scale (or 
less foreign competition). On the other hand, the more the rest of the EU accounts for 
the output of country, the more competitive the product market is for that countrys 
firms. Finally, an increase in the competitiveness indicator means that a countrys price 
competitive ability decreases, thereby decrease product demand and thus employment. 
 
5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical study of the effects of fiscal policy in open economies has typically fo-
cused on the role of government purchases of goods and services and on its effects on 
the relative price of non-tradables. Research by Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio, 
Giovannini and Krueger (1994), and De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) find 
empirical support, differing degrees, for the idea that an increase in government spend-
ing on goods and services, falling more heavily on labour-intensive non-tradable goods, 
leads to an appreciation of the relative price of non-tradable goods via an increase in the 
demand for labour. In regard to empirical studies on the intersection of public finance 
and labour economics, several contributions have looked at the effects of taxation on 
unemployment, particularly in closed economies. For example, paper by Daveri and 
Tabellini (2000) finds that the increase in unemployment and the slowdown in eco-
nomic growth are related, because of higher taxes on labour. Recent research by Kian-
der et al. (2004) analyses the relationship between unemployment, labour taxation and 
public spending using a panel data of OECD countries. Their estimation results suggest 
that countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes 
less extensively in financing welfare spending compared to countries with centralised or 
decentralised bargaining. 
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The empirical work closest to our study is the one conducted by Alesina and Perotti 
(1997). They use a model of an open economy to study the effects of government ex-
penditure and distortionary taxation on competitiveness using a panel data of 14 OECD 
countries from 1960 to 1990. They find that an increase in government transfers fi-
nanced by labour taxation generates a loss of international price competitiveness. How-
ever, their study does not focus on how the competitiveness of product markets affects 
employment. This study is the first to estimate how economic integration affects the 
impact of welfare policies on employment using panel data from EU-countries. 
 
5.1  Estimation strategy 
 
There are some issues to mention regarding our estimation strategy. One is the exogene-
ity of the regressors in equations (3.1) and (3.2). As Hamermesh (1986) discusses, some 
of them might actually be endogenous variables because firms (government) make their 
output (wage-based consumption) and employment decisions jointly. Quandt and Roser 
(1989) estimated an equilibrium model of the labour market, and used it to test the as-
sumption of production exogeneity. They did not reject the assumption that production 
is exogenous. On the other hand, and not only because of this potential problem, we 
estimate the constant-output labour price of employment by using least squares, and the 
scale-effect labour price of employment by using controls as instruments and by suppos-
ing that production is endogenous. Furthermore, there is a potential source of spurious 
correlation due to the possibility of endogeneity of labour tax rates and unemployment 
benefits.73 For instance, a common EU-wide shock that decreased employment could 
force an increase in tax rates to pay for increased unemployment benefits. Because of 
this potential correlation problem, we construct a variable of the government transfer 
expenditure rate to GDP that includes both unemployment subsidies and other social 
transfers, and labour tax rate is wage-based. If some regressors are endogenous, then 
                                                 
73 To cope with the possible endogeneity of these variables, we also estimated the specifications by re-
placing the current values of the labour tax rate and the ratio of transfers with their lagged values, but it 
shown that lagged estimators result in insignificant estimates. As Kiviet (1995) suggests, when a model 
for panel data includes lagged dependent explanatory variables, then the estimation procedures are as-
ymptotically valid only when the number of observations in the time dimension gets large. However, our 
set of data has a restricted sample size both in the cross-section dimension and time dimension. 
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least-squares parameter estimates will suffer from an endogeneity bias, the net direction 
of which is not clear.  
A third issue is that income tax systems are progressive and income tax brackets are 
not generally indexed. During periods of high inflation, many taxpayers tend to be 
pushed up to higher brackets merely because their nominal income increases. As a re-
sult, the average tax rate increases. When wage and price inflation are correlated, this 
effect might bias our estimates of the coefficient of the average tax rate. On the other 
hand, Alesina and Perotti (1997) find that excluding high-inflation years doesnt affect 
the coefficients of the tax variable. A fourth issue is that the positive relationship be-
tween the labour tax rate and unit labour costs might be influenced by the fact that two 
highly correlated variables appear at the denominator and the numerator in estimating 
equations (3.1) and (3.2). If the variation in wages dominates the behaviour of unit la-
bour costs and the tax rate, one should expect that negative relation between these two 
will be picked up by our estimates. As Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue, if, instead, the 
estimated effect of the tax rate is still negative, one can feel confident that the relation 
being estimated is not caused by the way we constructed the tax variable.74 Because of 
this potential correlation problem, we estimate the specifications in the dynamic model 
with a lagged value of unit labour costs. 
Supposing that integration has influenced the effects of welfare policies, it is also 
necessary to determine the effects of welfare policies on employment both for periods 
before integration and during the process of integration; therefore we divide the time 
series into two periods: 1975-1989, and 1990-2004. We first estimate the employment 
equations in levels by OLS and GLS using common intercepts over countries. Labour 
market institutions are important determinants of employment. As Daveri and Tabellini 
(2000) argue, institutions are hard to measure and they differ a lot across countries. 
They have, however, changed very slowly over time. Hence, the appropriate estimation 
method is by fixed effects, i.e. with country-specific intercepts which can proxy for in-
stitutions. Thus, we estimate the employment equation in levels by OLS with country 
dummies as intercepts, and with time dummies. Although, taking time differences also 
controls for unobserved time-invariant country fixed effects influencing the employ-
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ment level. However, time-differencing can also aggravate the regressor measurement 
error and result in inconsistent estimates.75 Hsiao (1986) argues that if variables are in-
deed subject to measurement errors, exploiting panel data to control for the effects of 
unobserved individual characteristics using standard differenced estimators may result 
in even more biased estimates than simple OLS estimators using cross-sectional data 
alone. We start by estimating the employment equations in levels. For equation (3.1), in 
order to estimate the constant-output labour price of employment we use the ordinary 
least squares estimation with fixed effect (OLS) and the generalized least squares esti-
mation (GLS); and for equation (3.2), in order to estimate the scale-effect labour price 
of employment we apply an instrumental variables estimation (2SLS and G2SLS). In 
fact, when we adopt the GLS estimation procedure it allows for heteroscedasticity with 
cross section correlation. Then we proceed with the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation, which provides a convenient framework for obtaining consistent, 
and, at least, asymptotically efficient estimators for the dynamic panel data (Bond, 
2002).76 The GMM method allows us to make different assumptions about the endoge-
neity of the right hand side variables, without the need to model them explicitly. The 
specific assumptions on endogeneity can then be easily tested using the Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictions. More specifically, equation (3.1) was estimated using the 
first-differenced GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method 
estimates the model in first differences but uses lagged variables in levels as instru-
ments. The model has been estimated with lagged employment and labour costs. Equa-
tion (3.2) was estimated using first-differenced instrumental variables (IV) estimation, 
applying FD2SLS to dynamic panel data with a lagged employment rate and a lagged 
value of unit labour costs. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
74 We also estimated the specifications with the rate of wage tax to GDP, but there was no difference in 
results between the constructed wage tax variables. 
75 We also estimated the specifications with all variables measured in first differences, but it shown that 
differenced estimators result in more biased estimates. Taking into account our data restrictions we didnt 
take longer differences. 
76 Comparing results of the different estimation methods between Daveri and Tabellini (2000), which 
estimate the unemployment equation both in levels by OLS and in first difference by OLS and GLS, and 
Kiander et al. (2004) who estimate the unemployment equation by dynamic method (GMM), suggests 
that unemployment is positively correlated with labour tax rates in Europe. Their estimated coefficients 
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5.2  Estimation results 
 
Our results for specifications by estimating levels are presented in table 5.1. In column 1 
and 2, the estimated constant-output labour price of employment for the total period 
1975-2004, and sub-periods 1975-1989 and 1990-2004 is reported. Furthermore, in col-
umn 3 and 4, the estimated scale effect labour price of employment is reported. The 
results are independent of whether we estimate specifications by OLS with a fixed ef-
fect or GLS. In all these regressions, the coefficients of the labour price have the ex-
pected sign, and they are statistically significant. The estimated value of the labour price 
is also relatively stable across different models. If both constant-output and the scale-
effect labour price of employment are consistently estimated then the difference be-
tween these two is an estimate of the scale effect. It is shown that the difference be-
tween constant-output and the scale-effect labour-price of employment doesnt become 
nearer an estimate of the scale effect during integration by estimating levels. However, 
coefficients of scale effects have the expected sign, and they are statistically significant. 
Our results for specifications from the use of dynamic panel data estimation are pre-
sented in table 5.2. In column 5, is reported the estimated constant-output labour price 
of employment for the total period and sub-periods, and in column 6, is reported the 
estimated scale effect labour-price of employment. Contrary to the results in levels, by 
using the GMM and FD2SLS methods, we find that the difference between constant-
output and the scale-effect labour-price of employment becomes nearer an estimate of 
the scale effect during integration. Comparing the first and last sub-period, we find that 
the negative impact of labour price on employment increases during integration with 
constant output, but decreases allowing scale effects appear. This may imply that eco-
nomic integration has caused an implicit structural reform of labour markets through the 
effects it has had on union market power, i.e. by moderating wage demands to improve 
employment. 
                                                                                                                                               
differ somewhat because the different used sets of countries, classification of countries, sets of variables, 
and time period. 
 87 
The basic result is that scale effects strengthen the negative impact of the labour tax 
rate on employment. Comparing constant-output and scale-effect estimations, the coef-
ficients of the labour tax rate have, in general, an unexpected sign without the integra-
tion effect, and the expected sign by using instruments. However, the magnitude of the 
parameter is not stable across different models. For the total and both sub-periods, there 
are some coefficients with unexpected sign and/or which are statistically insignificant 
by using the GMM and FD2SLS methods. By GMM, the model was estimated under 
the assumption that the tax rate, government consumption and government transfers are 
exogenous and therefore uncorrelated with the disturbances. However, this model does 
not seem to be well specified because the Sargan test does not reject the hypothesis of 
over-identifying restrictions for all periods, and the lack of a first order correlation of 
the differenced errors as implied by the AR(1) test. There is a potential source of corre-
lation due to the possible endogeneity of tax rates and unemployment benefits. This 
potential endogeneity could also be reflected in our method of measurement. Further-
more, by using both methods in levels, there are, for first sub-period, some coefficients 
of unexpected sign which are also statistically insignificant. This negative relationship 
between the labour tax rate and unit labour costs might be influenced by the fact that 
two highly correlated variables appear at the denominator and the numerator. If the 
variation in wages dominates the behaviour of unit labour costs and the tax rate, one 
should expect that negative relation between these two will be picked up by our esti-
mates. 
We note that for the total period, by estimating levels allowing scale effects appear, 
the negative impact of the labour tax rate on employment is highest in countries where 
trade unions play an important role but are decentralised. This finding supports the idea 
that an increase in labour taxation will be most harmful to employment in mid-
centralised countries. However, by using the FD2SLS method, the negative impact of 
the labour tax rate on employment is significant only in countries where wage bargain-
ing is centralised. On the contrary, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) suggest that unemploy-
ment is strongly and positively correlated with labour taxation in Europe, but that no 
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significant relationship exists in countries where bargaining is centralised or co-
ordinated.77 
Unexpectedly, scale effects weaken the negative impact of transfers on employment. 
In general, the coefficients for transfers are higher without the integration effect than by 
using instruments. However, it is shown that the coefficients of the ratio of transfers 
become greater during integration with scale effects. The coefficients of the ratio of 
transfers have the expected sign, and they are statistical significant, with the exception 
of some coefficients for the sub-periods. This may reflect the fact that international in-
tegration leads to a structural change in social security systems, i.e. an increasing need 
for social insurance arrangements to ensure some income stabilization in the presence of 
cross-country shocks. While high benefits lead to high unemployment, they also lead to 
high participation because they make participation in the labour market more attractive, 
i.e. participation being necessary in order to be eligible for high benefits. 
Furthermore, we note that scale effects weaken the positive impact of public con-
sumption on employment. The coefficient of the ratio of wage-based consumption is 
higher without the integration effect than by using instruments. Although it is shown 
that the coefficient of consumption has become greater during integration with scale 
effects and decreases with constant output. The coefficients of the ratio of consumption 
have the expected sign, and they are statistical significant. The exception is the last sub-
period without the integration effect, where this coefficient is statistically insignificant 
by estimating levels. 
Overall, the results provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that economic 
integration has contributed to the distortion effects of welfare policies on employment. 
While, the results provide some support for the hypothesis that the scale effects of inter-
national integration strengthen the negative impact of the labour tax rate on employ-
ment. Although scale effects weaken the negative impact of transfers on employment, 
this impact increases during integration. On the other hand, integration weakens the 
positive impact of public consumption on employment. 
 
                                                 
77 We also estimated the employment equations both in levels and in first-differences without labour 
costs, which are not reported here. These findings support the idea that an increase in labour taxation 
should be less harmful to employment in centralised countries. 
 89 
 
Table 5.1 Regression results for employment (in levels). 
 
 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is employment rate. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Degrees of 
freedom are presented in square brackets. (4) Column [1]: estimated by OLS with fixed effect. (5) Column [2]: esti-
mated by GLS allowing correlation across countries. (6) Column [3]: estimated by IV with fixed effect. (7) Column 
[4]: estimated by IV. 
 
 
 
Method
Equation (3.1) 
OLS
Equation (3.1) 
GLS
Equation (3.2) 
2SLS
Equation (3.2) 
G2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Period 1975 - 2004
Constant 48.33 (26.0) 48.92 (21.1) 91.20 (53.9) 90.80 (49.6)
GDP 1 1 0.174 (5.65) 0.180 (6.00)
Labour tax - Nor 0.093 (0.65) 0.096 (0.96) -0.033 (-1.77) -0.051 (-2.02)
Labour tax - Con 0.178 (1.16) 0.471 (3.57) -0.227 (-4.70) -0.191 (-4.09)
Labour tax - Brit 1.875 (9.56) 1.240 (8.10) -0.211 (-2.17) -0.186 (-2.22)
Labour price -0.623 (-37.7) -0.645 (-38.0) -0.135 (-7.15) -0.139 (-7.41)
Transfers -71.05 (-7.38) -55.97 (-5.59) -33.28 (-10.4) -32.32 (-10.3)
Public consumption 162.1 (11.1) 142.1 (9.25) 59.34 (10.2) 58.17 (10.3)
Number of obs 450 450 450 450
R² (within) 0.888 0.885 0.537 0.535
F-test (p-value) 98.69 0.000 67.78 0.000
CHI² 2839 [6] 405.8 [7]
Sub-period 1975 - 1989
Constant 56.41 (37.9) 55.99 (20.7) 78.82 (6.43) 74.59 (4.96)
GDP 1 1 0.486 (1.73) 0.562 (1.68)
Labour tax - Nor 0.314 (2.82) 0.141 (1.40) 0.186 (1.83) 0.028 (0.43)
Labour tax - Con -0.274 (-2.33) -0.176 (-1.46) -0.250 (-3.20) -0.104 (-1.08)
Labour tax - Brit 0.086 (0.32) 0.262 (1.29) -0.094 (-0.46) 0.096 (0.43)
Labour price -0.471 (-25.7) -0.466 (-23.8) -0.294 (-3.01) -0.313 (-2.77)
Transfers -40.03 (-3.74) -37.85 (-3.32) -19.09 (-1.42) -18.79 (-1.21)
Public consumption 51.19 (3.35) 49.60 (3.05) 34.62 (2.57) 34.52 (2.11)
Number of obs 225 225 225 225
R² (within) 0.891 0.889 0.473 0.432
F-test (p-value) 265.6 0.000 31.85 0.000
CHI² 1358 [6] 121.7 [7]
Sub-period 1990 - 2004
Constant 47.59 (9.86) 50.54 (10.7) 91.68 (35.8) 89.79 (31.3)
GDP 1 1 0.089 (2.02) 0.124 (2.63)
Labour tax - Nor 0.211 (0.95) 0.285 (2.32) -0.336 (-4.71) -0.216 (-3.61)
Labour tax - Con 0.372 (1.27) 0.532 (3.02) -0.008 (-0.90) -0.082 (-1.02)
Labour tax - Brit 2.769 (11.3) 1.615 (8.47) -0.431 (-2.53) -0.275 (-1.71)
Labour price -0.677 (-20.7) -0.706 (-19.9) -0.048 (-1.52) -0.070 (-2.03)
Transfers -2.754 (-0.19) 19.18 (1.36) -26.09 (-5.93) -23.86 (-5.34)
Public consumption 50.21 (2.16) 18.75 (0.82) 46.10 (6.63) 43.39 (6.26)
Number of obs 225 225 225 225
R² (within) 0.813 0.792 0.528 0.517
F-test (p-value) 31.46 0.000 65.88 0.000
CHI² 660.9 [6] 181.0 [7]
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Table 5.2 Regression results for employment (dynamic panel data estimation). 
 
 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is lagged employment rate. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in 
parentheses. (3) Column [5]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation method. (4) 
Column [2]: FD2SLS refers to first-differenced IV estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation of the 
differenced errors. 
 
Method Equation (3.1) GMM Equation (3.2) FD2SLS
[5] [6]
Period 1975 - 2004
Employment   0.970 (110.)   0.417 (7.80)
GDP 1   0.197 (1.86)
Labour tax - Nor  0.019 (0.64)  -0.053 (-1.75)
Labour tax - Con  0.168 (5.01)  -0.024 (-0.57)
Labour tax - Brit  0.250 (6.15)  -0.056 (-0.50)
Labour price  -0.023 (-3.65)  -0.136 (-3.60)
Transfers  -6.659 (-3.48)  -4.093 (-1.75)
Public consumption   14.86 (4.86)   10.37 (2.66)
Number of obs 420 420
R² (within) 0.675
Sargan test  (p-value) 510.8 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.105)
AR(2) (0.000)
CHI²  (p-value) 464.7 (0.000)
Sub-period 1975 - 1989
Employment   0.811 (25.9)   0.397 (7.62)
GDP 1   0.198 (2.00)
Labour tax - Nor  -0.021 (-0.41)  -0.016 (-0.48)
Labour tax - Con  0.023 (0.43)  -0.060 (-1.06)
Labour tax - Brit  -0.272 (-2.25)  -0.224 (-2.73)
Labour price  -0.081 (-5.32)  -0.131 (-3.99)
Transfers  -22.68 (-6.04)  -5.548 (-1.30)
Public consumption   30.26 (5.75)   11.82 (2.07)
Number of obs 210 210
R² (within) 0.826
Sargan test  (p-value) 147.9 (0.003)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.943)
CHI²  (p-value) 218.7 (0.000)
Sub-period 1990 - 2004
Employment   0.947 (70.3)   0.497 (8.22)
GDP 1   0.067 (2.80)
Labour tax - Nor  0.027 (0.61)  -0.192 (-2.91)
Labour tax - Con  0.081 (1.40)  0.019 (0.28)
Labour tax - Brit  0.315 (5.26)  -0.037 (-0.18)
Labour price  -0.025 (-2.26)  -0.094 (-3.20)
Transfers  -4.942 (-1.71)  -6.313 (-1.79)
Public consumption   15.78 (3.36)   14.11 (2.42)
Number of obs 210 210
R² (within) 0.693
Sargan test  (p-value) 314.5 (0.271)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.010)
CHI²  (p-value) 240.5 (0.000)
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6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study has been twofold to investigate how economic integration 
affects the impact of welfare policies on employment by using theoretical model and 
empirical analysis. We considered the possibilities of financing the public sector by 
general labour taxation in an economy which is becoming more integrated into the in-
ternational product market. We built the theoretical framework for estimating employ-
ment and determining the impact of economic integration on the effects of welfare poli-
cies. Using a general theoretical model of intra-industry trade, we analyzed how eco-
nomic integration changes the impact of welfare policies on employment. The model 
captured scale effects running from product markets to the effects of welfare policies on 
employment. Increasing job mobility implies a change in the distortions arising from 
taxes and social security contributions levied on labour, which, in turn, affects the abil-
ity to pursue welfare policies, i.e. public consumption and social security expenses. We 
show that the effects of economic integration on the impact of welfare policies on em-
ployment clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better 
economies of scale. As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of 
economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by 
labour taxation. 
We formulated an econometric model in which the aim is to determine whether 
European integration has changed the impact of welfare policies on employment using a 
panel of European countries from 1975 to 2004. Our findings provide some support for 
the claim that the scale effects of international integration strengthen the negative im-
pact of the labour tax rate on employment. However, scale effects weaken the negative 
impact of transfers on employment; although this negative impact increased over inte-
gration. Furthermore, we noted that integration weakens the positive impact of public 
consumption on employment. These results provide inconsistent evidence for the hy-
pothesis that economic integration has contributed to the distortionary effects of welfare 
policies on employment. 
 
 92 
 
Finally, the study raises a potentially interesting area for future research. This would 
be to extend the integration model to capture the role of international capital flows and, 
in general, factor substitution possibilities, i.e. the substitution effects of economic inte-
gration on the impact of welfare policies on employment. Another point that we left out 
of the discussion was redistributive welfare policies related, in particular, to fiscal ad-
justments with redistribution and fiscal reform. Our findings raise important questions 
for policy-making in a situation of economic integration, in particular in regard to the 
cost of the more generous European welfare states. 
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IV  Profit Sharing, Economic Integration and Em-
ployment: Econometric Evidence from Finland 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
By using theoretical modelling and empirical analysis, we investigate how economic 
integration affects the impact of profit sharing on employment. We show that, in theory, 
the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment 
clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of 
economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the ability of profit sharing 
to improve employment through economic integration increases with moderated wages. 
While, the economic integration associating with market power in turn decrease the 
possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve employment. As increased 
trade competition crowds out better advantages from economies of scale, economic in-
tegration increases profit sharing with wage-moderating and thus improves labour de-
mand. We test the idea of whether European integration has changed the impact of 
profit sharing on employment in Finland using data from the manufacturing sector for 
the years 1996 to 2004. The results show that profit-sharing has a positive impact on 
employment during the process of economic integration, but can have ambiguous ef-
fects on the stability of employment. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The earliest arguments of the benefits of economic integration are based on the idea that 
international competition promotes economic efficiency. Protectionism is costly be-
cause resources are not allocated to areas where a country has a comparative advantage. 
Bernard et al. (2006) find that economic activity is reallocated towards high-
productivity firms as trade costs fall in a given industry. The benefits of economic inte-
gration result from access to larger markets, and therefore larger profits and possible 
economies of scale. The recent emphasis on imperfectly competitive markets in interna-
tional trade creates another argument for gains from integration: in a protected market 
dominated by only a few firms, trade reform increases competition, which is also impor-
tant for productive efficiency. Research on productivity often examines the relationship 
between productivity increases and structural changes such as trade policy reforms in an 
economy. According to recent heterogeneous firm models (see, for example, Helpman 
et al. 2003, or Bernard et al. 2003) the benefits of trade accrue to the most productive 
firms within an industry, whereas the costs are felt disproportionately by the least pro-
ductive.  Bayoumi et al. (2004) conclude that greater competition significantly stimu-
lates macroeconomic performance and that it may improve macroeconomic manage-
ment by increasing the responsiveness of wages and prices to market conditions.  Ac-
cording to this view, intensified competition in product markets could be expected to 
affect the impact of profit sharing on employment. The relationship between profit-
sharing and a firm's performance has been addressed in several empirical studies (see 
Fitzroy and Kraft 1987, Cable and Wilson 1989 and 1990, Wadhwani and Wall 1990, 
Kruse 1992, Cahuc and Dormont 1997, Conyon and Freeman 2001). All of these studies 
show that profit-sharing is correlated with better productivity. This implies that em-
ployment might be higher in profit-sharing firms through the productivity effects of 
economic integration. Gersbach (2000) argues that reductions in product market imper-
fections might enhance employment through lower mark-ups, higher total productivity 
and expanded sets of product varieties. If, however, it is supposed that economic inte-
gration only strengthens price competition, then the productivity changes associated 
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with trade reform may be mismeasured. As a result, the impact of liberalization on 
product markets would lead to biased estimates for the relationship between trade re-
form and productivity growth. This suggests that changes in both price-cost margins and 
returns to scale should be used as the measures of competition for estimating the effects 
of economic integration on the impact of profit-sharing on employment. 
There is also the issue of employment stability. One concern is how changes in the 
degree of product market competition can affect labour practices during the progress of 
integration where firms face aggregate and industry-specific shocks. Economic integra-
tion is a process in which markets for goods and factors of production tend to become 
perfectly integrated. The mobility of production has been increasing as a consequence 
of product market integration. As Rodrik (1998, 2000) argues, open economies, which 
are free to trade with each other, differ from closed economies in the respect that, in 
particular, capital and employers are internationally mobile. The progress of integration 
with wider trade and capital flows has been strengthening competition both within and 
across industries and countries, which has reflected in the labour market. Product de-
mand becomes more sensitive to price differentials between economies and firms loca-
tion decisions more responsive to relative labour costs. Rodrik (1997, 1998) explains 
that when the shock of product market is a negative one there is a larger decrease in 
employment in more open economies. A consequence of integration is greater instabil-
ity in labour-market outcomes when openness magnifies the effects of shocks on labour 
demand. On the other hand, firms with access to the wider market are expected to be 
able to expand sales and production to take better advantage of economies of scale 
while continuing to cover production costs despite lower price-cost margins. This im-
plies that the creative destruction of exporting is associated with the reallocation of re-
sources from less efficient to more efficient firms, which may generate more job crea-
tion than job destruction. When discussing the impact of profit sharing on changes to 
net employment we refer here to profit sharing as a method of payment based on the 
performance of firms, as opposed to base wage. The loss of national adjustment vari-
ables with the progress of integration will result in an increased need for alternative 
flexible mechanisms to correct possible asymmetric shocks across industries and coun-
tries. Therefore, competitiveness pressure on the labour market towards greater flexibil-
ity is expected to increase under diminishing trade barriers. Haffner et al. (2000) find 
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evidence that both product market competition and labour market flexibility have been 
fostered by integration within EU-countries. Weitzman (1985, 1987) argues that the 
merit of profit-sharing is that it guarantees stability of employment in the face of 
shocks. The theoretical arguments rely crucially on the assumption that firms use the 
base wage and not the total level of remuneration as the relevant marginal cost of la-
bour. A wage system has a negative macroeconomic externality, while a profit-sharing 
system has favourable externality effects on employment and, indirectly, on price stabil-
ity. It has been argued that if there is a general rise in product market competition, the 
corresponding loss of rents would be shared between firms and workers with no overall 
impact on employment (see Geroski et al., 1995, for example). Kruse (1991) presents 
evidence suggesting that at the firm level the statistical association between aggregate 
unemployment and employment is less strong for profit-sharing firms. However, 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990) present a more formal test of this proposition in the context 
of a labour demand model, and find no difference in the effect of aggregate demand 
shocks on employment between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms. 
Profit sharing has been extensively used in European countries as part of the com-
pensation scheme in the labour market.  Pendleton et al. (2001) present detailed data on 
the significant proportion of workplaces with financial employee participation, in par-
ticular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-countries. Profit sharing has in-
creased considerably in Finland during the late 1990s.  Profit sharing has been seen as a 
way to introduce wage flexibility in a setting where wage levels are determined central-
ized, as in case of Finland. We consider the hypothesis that profit sharing is introduced 
not as an incentive mechanism, but as a way to obtain more stable employment in the 
process of economic integration. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment using theoretical 
modelling and empirical analysis. The commitment to profit sharing serves as a strate-
gic device inducing a reduction in the negotiated base wage, thereby generating a link 
between imperfections in the product market and equilibrium employment. In theory, 
the impact of profit sharing on employment with economic integration depends defi-
nitely on a trade-off between intensified competition and better advantages from 
economies of scale. A comparatively high degree of product market competition will 
make labour demand more elastic and shift it outwards. Due to rent sharing behaviour, 
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wage rates can be expected to be inversely related to product market competition. 
Hence, it can be argued that the ability of profit sharing to improve employment through 
economic integration is progressively increased when product market competition in-
creases. However, there is a case in which firms might choose to pay higher wages 
when they have market power and are earning higher monopoly rents. With increased 
integration and competition, firms with access to the wider market are expected to be 
able to expand sales and production to take better advantage of economies of scale. 
Thus, market power may arise from specialization in production and differentiation of 
products to establish segmented markets. When economic integration is associated with 
an increase in market power it might, in turn, decrease the ability of profit sharing with 
higher wages to improve employment. As a consequence, the validity of the relationship 
has to be determined empirically. The focus of the empirical work is to determine the 
effect of European integration on the impact of profit sharing on the employment. The 
question of the relationship between the intensity of economic integration and employ-
ment in the presence of profit sharing has not been addressed before. Our study uses 
data from the Finnish manufacturing sector from 1996 to 2004. 
The study is organized as follows: section 2 focuses on identifying the main channels 
through which economic integration affects the impact of profit sharing on employment. 
It specifies a theoretical framework for empirical analysis. Section 3 formulates the 
econometric model. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estima-
tion strategy, and reports on the empirical results. A few concluding remarks are given 
in the last section. 
 
2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We construct a general theoretical model of intra-industry trade in order to capture the 
effects of product market integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment via 
the removal of barriers. Intra-industry trade may be defined as the two-way exchange of 
goods in which neither country seems to have a comparative cost advantage. We assume 
that labour markets are unionized, which generates rigidities in the wage setting process. 
As Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) emphasize, profit sharing decisions take place within 
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the framework of an institutional environment where profit-sharing schemes have to be 
independent of wage agreements. The assumption is that the firms commit themselves 
to a profit sharing arrangement which specifies the extent to which wage contracts are 
performance-related.78 The firm determines the level of employment once the base wage 
and the profit share have been determined. Wages serve as a commitment that the firm 
takes as a given when it decides on profit sharing. We consider an open economy where 
there are many firms in a given industry producing differentiated goods with capital and 
labour as inputs. Supposing that product markets are imperfectly competitive, there is 
monopolistic competition in good markets adapting the model of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), in which there is assumed to be no strategic (Bertrand or Cournot) interaction 
between firms (see page 21). 
Assuming that linear-homogenous technology can be represented for each firm i in 
industry j by the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function form, it 
can be specified as 
 
(2.1) [ ] jijiji jijiji KLY ϕϕϕ 1+=  
  
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is defined as 
0
1
1 ≥
−
≡
ji
ji ϕ
σ , and capital is denoted by jiK , and labour by jiL . The elasticity of sub-
stitution is defined as the effect of a change in the relative factor prices on relative in-
puts of those two factors, holding output constant (see Allen 1938, or Hamermesh 
1993). It can be thought as parameterized on trade costs ( jτ ) to reflect the fact that inte-
gration expands the set of factors by increasing the mobility of capital (see page 27). 
Based on our theory from essay II, we suppose, for simplicity, that all industries only 
produce differentiated products. Firms face in industry j representative consumers 
tastes which are assumed to be represented by the utility function 
                                                 
78 It is crucial that firms feel able to reduce average total remuneration. If firms feel that they must con-
tinue to pay the same amount to each worker as under the existing wage system, introducing profit shar-
ing will not alter hiring behaviour. As a result, as Wadhwani and Wall (1990) argue, if firms feel commit-
ted to paying a certain total amount, the manner in which this amount was divided into the two compo-
nents (base wage and profit linked pay), would become irrelevant. 
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where ji
n
ij DD 1=Σ=  is an index of consumption of the differentiated products in industry 
j, and jb  is the positive constant. Firm i in industry j is assumed to choose the price and 
decide on employment so as maximize the following profit function 
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where jip  represents the price of variety i, and capital costs are denoted by jir . The firm 
takes the wage rate jiw  and profit share 
w
jiΠ  as a given. Profit share determines what 
fraction of a firm´s profits will be transferred to employed workers. From the underlying 
utility function, given by (2.2), by imposing the symmetry assumption, a consumer 
maximizing79 will set the demand in the product market as 
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where 1
1
1
>
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j
j θ
ε  is product-demand elasticity, and ∗jP   represents an index of the 
price level in terms of international integration. The above solution (equation (2.4)) is 
described on page 22. The demand of product type i is given as 
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79 Each consumer maximises their utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint. The budget con-
straint simply requires that the value of expenditure is not more than value of the income. 
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where jip  represents the price of variety i with 1>jφ  denoting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two product types (see Helpman and Krugman 1989). The above 
equation (2.5) is explained in Chapter 2.2 of essay II. From utility maximizing of con-
sumer and by using (2.5), we have 
 
(2.6) jjj jjijji PpaD
εφφ −−
=
*   
 
That is, demand for any product type depends on both its own price in terms of other 
products and on the overall price index in terms of that product. So long as jε < jφ , i.e. 
the elasticity of substitution within an industry is larger than the price elasticity, the de-
mand for an individual product will depend positively on the overall price index. 
Consider now the impact of a reduction in marginal trade costs on product markets. 
Let jτ  denotes a trade cost due to transactions costs and other trade barriers related to 
foreign trade80 at industry j. The effects on imperfectly competitive product markets of 
increased integration via declining trade costs are basically of two counteracting sorts 
(described on pages 23 and 24). First, individual producers with access to the wider 
market are expected to be able to expand production to take better advantage of econo-
mies of scale. Thus, we assume that 
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Second, with increased integration and competition, an industrys market share be-
comes increasingly sensitive to price changes, raising the elasticity of the consumption 
price. Thus, we have 
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80 For simplicity, we assume that the trade costs of import and export outputs are equal. 
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The relative price *
j
ji
P
p
 is chosen by the firm. In the imperfect competition we then 
have the condition of the pricing rule for product types in industry j 
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The above equation (2.9) is explained in Chapter 2.2 of essay II. Price equals the mar-
ginal revenue from exporting, in optimum, in which the relative trade cost must equal 
the mark-up factor, i.e. 
1
1
−+
+
=
+
jj
jj
j
j
a εφ
εφτ
 (see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1989, p. 
18). We have described the characterization of the optimal pricing rule in the Proposi-
tion 1 of Essay II (see pages 24 and 25). 
Using (2.6), under the utility maximization of an individual consumer, i.e. marginal 
utility is equal to marginal cost, each firm i in industry j faces a downward sloping de-
mand curve 
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The closer substitutes for output jiY  on the international market are the more elastic 
output demand becomes. Profit maximization implies that firms will set a price which 
exceeds the marginal cost by a constant mark-up factor, i.e. using (2.9) we have, in op-
timum, 1
1
1
>
−+
+
=
+
jj
jj
j
j
a εφ
εφτ
. During the process of integration, there are pressures for 
mark-ups to decline along with the increasing elasticity of product demand. On the other 
hand, a decrease in product-substitution elasticity may compensate for this effect. For 
example, using Italian firm level data Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) conclude that the 
EU Single Market Program has led to a decrease in mark-ups and an increase in produc-
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tivity for those firms expected, ex-ante, to be more sensitive to the abolition of external 
trade barriers.81 
By determining the implicit form of labour demand, conditional labour costs can be 
derived from (2.1) as 
 
(2.11) 
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Capital costs jir  can be derived in a similar way. Under the assumption of wage-taking 
and profit-maximizing behaviour, labour demand can be written by using equations 
(2.10) and (2.11) 
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Differentiating (2.12) with respect to wages gives 
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Firms decide on employment to maximize profits for a given wage rate and profit share, 
constrained by both the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods and the 
elasticity of demand in their product market 
 
(2.14) [ ]jijijj jijijijiwjijiwji rwpp σσεφ −−−− −−Π−=ΠΠ− 11)1()1( . 
 
Differentiating (2.14) with respect to the wages gives 
 
                                                 
81 Overall, these results are consistent with the long standing view that economic integration reduces 
firms' market power and increases productivity via the removal of trade barriers. 
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Determining wages and profit share, the labour market is assumed to be imperfectly 
competitive. It is commonly accepted that the monopoly union model, in a simple way 
(see, e.g., Booth 1995), captures the qualitative implications of different labour market 
models, at least in respect to generate unemployment and in the wage response to the 
degree of centralization. The base wage is determined by a trade union under those cir-
cumstances where profit share wjiΠ  is given. It is assumed that firms commit themselves 
to a profit sharing arrangement which specifies to what extent the wage contracts are 
performance-related. The profit sharing decision is made in anticipation of its effects on 
the base wage and labour demand. Each monopoly union maximizes the income of their 
members subject to the labour demand function (2.12), and is constrained by both the 
elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods and the elasticity of demand in the 
product market. Let jiN  be the labour force for each firm i in industry j, and 
thus [ ]jiji LN −  is unemployment. The unions utility function is given by  
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where the first term captures the rent to the employed in industry j, and jis  captures the 
outside option, i.e. benefits for an unemployed union member. Some authors (in particu-
lar, Weitzman (1987) and Jackman (1988)) have argued that in models where unions 
keep wages above market-clearing levels, the introduction of profit sharing may reduce 
unemployment. This will occur essentially because a given reduction in the base wage 
leads to a less than one-to-one reduction in total remuneration. So, provided that em-
ployers only look at the base wage in setting employment, the trade-off between em-
ployment and wages becomes more favourable to employment. Using the implicit form 
of labour demand (2.12) the elasticity of labour demand with wages can be written as 
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That is, the elasticity of labour demand is equal to the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour jiσ . The higher the elasticity of substitution, the more elastic labour 
demand is. 
Maximization of (2.16) with respect to the wage rate yields an equation for equilib-
rium wages 
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According to (2.18) the wage rate is proportional to the outside option. We can see that 
the integration of product markets has no direct effect on the base wage. However, 
product market integration affects wages through three indirect mechanisms, namely via 
profit share, the elasticity of labour demand with own price, and the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labour. By using (2.8), if product markets are imperfectly 
competitive, integration can make product markets more competitive via international 
trade. Several models of imperfect competition predict that trade liberalization makes 
demand more elastic, but not infinitely so. The market shares of a domestic supplier and 
a foreign supplier become more sensitive to relative price when industry is more inte-
grated. International integration reducing trade frictions and therefore making it easier 
to shift supplier, can potentially have a large effect on product-elasticities. In contrast, 
by using (2.7), an individual industry with access to the wider market might be able to 
expand sales and production, thereby taking better advantage of economies scale, which 
can be associated with decreased elasticities of product substitution.  It is important to 
emphasize, as Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) argue, that profit sharing has no direct 
effect on the wage elasticity of labour demand because profit sharing operates like a 
non-distortionary profit tax. We can conclude that the increased elasticity of labour de-
mand will have a wage-moderating effect: 
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Since the demand for labour is a derived demand, which varies proportionately with the 
elasticity of demand for goods, intensified product market competition alone makes the 
demand for labour more elastic because of declining mark-ups. Intuitively, it seems 
likely that increased product market competition makes it harder for firms to survive 
with higher wages, thereby making firms employment decisions more sensitive to 
changes in the wage rate. Then, with heightened foreign competition unions face a more 
elastic labour demand relation and thus moderate their wage demands. Huizinga (1993), 
and Danthine and Hunt (1994), for example, find that the creation of firm level competi-
tion increases the elasticity of labour demand which moderates unions wage demands, 
i.e. increased goods market competition leads to lower wages and then higher employ-
ment. However, the effect of integration on the price sensitivity of market share may be 
compensated for by its direct effect on market share, i.e. market power can arise from 
specialization in production and differentiation of products allowing firms to take better 
advantage of economies scale with segmented markets. Nickell et al. (1994) and Stewart 
(1990) find evidence of a positive (time series) relationship between wages and market 
power. This suggests that the sharing of mark-ups and higher wages are associated with 
market share. From (2.18) we can directly observe that an increased profit share wjiΠ  
will have a wage-moderating effect: 
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We can assume that intensified product market competition increases a firm's incentive 
to use profit sharing. This is because with perfect competition in the product market the 
wage elasticity of labour demand is very high and therefore wage moderation can be 
achieved with introducing profit sharing. However, market power can arise from spe-
cialization in production and differentiation of products, being able to take better advan-
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tage of economies scale with segmented markets, which reduces firm's incentive to use 
profit sharing because of the higher wage rate.82 These findings are summarized in 
 
Proposition  2  Lower trade costs resulting from increased integration, a higher num-
ber of firms and, in consequence, higher elasticity of product demand ( 0<∂
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better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, lower elasticity of substitu-
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Given the equilibrium wage rate (2.18), we arrive at the employment equation by us-
ing labour demand (2.12) 
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As expected, employment correlates negatively with unemployment benefits jis . The 
number of firms (both domestic and foreign) competing in an industry can arise as a 
result of the integration process, which shifts the foreign output mix towards this indus-
                                                 
82 Nickell (1999) finds some evidence that the sharing of monopoly rents leads to higher wages in the 
presence of market power in the product market. 
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try. The integration process can force domestic firms into a state of heightened foreign 
competition. We see that an increase in the elasticity of product demand triggered by 
more firms (i.e. jε  rises) decreases a firm's labour demand ( 0<∂
∂
j
jiL
ε
). Product demand 
becomes more price elastic when product markets are more integrated, but is the effect 
of product market integration on the price sensitivity of market share larger than its di-
rect effect on market share? As a consequence of decreased trade costs, product substi-
tution becomes less elastic (i.e., jφ  falls), which can be associated with better advan-
tages from economies of scale, thereby increasing a firm's labour demand ( 0<
∂
∂
j
jiL
φ ). 
Because of these counteracting effects we cannot conclude that the scale effects of inte-
gration tend to decrease labour demand. We summarize these findings in 
 
Proposition  3  Lower trade costs with increased integration, a higher number of firms 
and, in consequence, higher elasticity of product demand will decrease labour demand, 
whereas better advantage of economies of scale and, in consequence, lower elasticity of 
substitution between differentiated products will increase it. 
 
By using (2.19) when unions face a more elastic labour demand relation and thus 
moderate their wage demands, we find that increased labour-demand elasticity increases 
labour demand due to the reduced market power of unions: 
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It is perfectly plausible that in firms where wages are bargained collectively an increase 
in product market competition will tend to lower wages83 and raise employment in the 
                                                 
83 Abowd and Lemieux (1993) have studied how product market conditions affect wages through their 
effects on the financial strength of a firm by using data from collective agreements in Canada and they 
show that higher foreign competition reduces wages. 
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presence of profit sharing.84 From (2.21) we can directly observe that increased profit 
share will increase employment: 
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We can conclude that the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing 
on employment clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better 
advantages from economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the abil-
ity of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increases as a 
result of moderated wages. However, when economic integration is associated with in-
creased market power, the incentives for profit-sharing decrease with higher wages, and 
the effect on employment is negative. As increased trade competition crowds out better 
advantages from economies of scale, economic integration increases profit sharing 
through wage-moderating and thus improves labour demand. We summarize the charac-
terization of the scale effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on 
employment in 
 
Proposition  4  As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of econo-
mies of scale, 
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, the process of economic integration increases incentives for using profit 
sharing ( 0<
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), which improves employ-
ment ( 0>
Π∂
∂
w
ji
jiL ). 
 
                                                 
84 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004) developed a monopolistic competition model with 
collective wage bargaining, but not with profit sharing, to study the effects of product market competition 
under imperfectly competitive labour markets. They argue that higher product market competition will 
increase employment. 
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The process of integration reduces trade barriers, and therefore leads not only to 
more trade, but also to more foreign investment. Increased investment opportunities 
make firms more sensitive to changes in such costs. During the process of integration, 
international trade can increase the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
As Rodrik and van Ypersele (2001) explain, in the process of integration, real and fi-
nancial capital are more sensitive to respond to shocks such as changes in productivity 
or the terms of trade. A negative shock at home may induce a capital outflow abroad. A 
capital outflow is also liable to affect the marginal productivity of labour, in turn lead-
ing to effects on wages (see, e.g., Keen and Marchand, 1997). From (2.17) we can di-
rectly observe that the higher the elasticity of substitution is, the more elastic labour 
demand is. This implies that increased elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital increases incentives for using profit sharing, resulting in a lower labour price, 
which increases labour demand. Particularly where production centres on the use of 
low-skill workers, employers can react sensitively to changes in prevailing wages by 
investing. Therefore, when wage compression occurs through union activity, firms are 
encouraged to invest in technologies that increase the productivity of less-skilled work-
ers. We find that as a consequence of decreased trade costs as substitutability increases 
(i.e. 0>
∂
∂
j
ji
τ
σ
), labour demand increases:  
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In contrast, shifts in production technology or increases in the use of physical capital 
also require workers acquire to new skills, which increases the demand for human capi-
tal (i.e. 0<
∂
∂
j
ji
τ
σ
) and thus decreases the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital. This suggests that decreased incentives to use profit sharing, resulting in higher 
labour prices, depreciate labour demand. We summarize the substitution effect of inte-
gration on the impact of profit sharing on employment in 
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Proposition  5  Lower trade costs from increased integration, and a higher elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital ( 0>
∂
∂
j
ji
τ
σ
) will increase incentives for using 
profit sharing ( 0<
Π∂
∂
w
ji
jiw ) and decrease wages ( 0<
∂
∂
ji
jiw
σ
), which increases labour de-
mand ( 0>
∂
∂
ji
jiL
σ
), whereas a lower elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
( 0<
∂
∂
j
ji
τ
σ
) will decrease incentives for profit sharing ( 0<
Π∂
∂
w
ji
jiw ) and increase wages 
( 0<
∂
∂
ji
jiw
σ
), which decreases labour demand ( 0>
∂
∂
ji
jiL
σ
). 
 
In summary, the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on 
employment depend definitely on a trade-off between intensified competition and better 
advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the ability of 
profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increases as a re-
sult of moderated wages. In contrast, when economic integration is associated with in-
creased market power, the incentives for profit-sharing decrease with higher wages, and 
the effect on employment is negative. As increased trade competition crowds out better 
advantages from economies of scale, economic integration increases profit sharing with 
wage-moderating and thus improves labour demand. In addition, if the elasticity of sub-
stitution between labour and capital increases during the process of integration, incen-
tives to use profit sharing increase with a lower labour price, which increases labour 
demand. 
 
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
In our empirical work, the strategy is to follow the theoretical framework in Section 2 as 
the basis for econometric identification, using the equilibrium condition for employ-
ment. We estimate an employment equation, and attempt to evaluate whether economic 
integration has changed the effects of profit sharing on employment. To understand the 
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effects of profit-sharing, a useful method is to compare profit-sharing (PS) with non-
profit-sharing (NPS) firms. Taking a log-linear approximation of equation (2.18), em-
ployment85 can be written as a regression function: 
 
(3.1) 
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where i indexes firms, j is the industry, and t the year. L is the quantity of labour em-
ployed, skill the ratio of skilled workers to total employment, ω real labour costs, wπ  
the ratio of profit-sharing payments to wages; a  denotes the firm-specific fixed effect. 
We tried to improve the estimated model by adding skilled workers ratio in order to take 
labour qualification into account. It is assumed that, in general, a high share of highly-
skilled workers, with the resulting higher labour price, has a negative impact on total 
employment. For the scale effects of real output, we use two different variables: the 
share of Finlands exports to other EU-countries in manufacturing production (x) and 
the share of the output of European Union in manufacturing production ( ∗y ). The first 
variable attempts to measure foreign demand for a firms products, the second attempts 
to measure overall demand of European Union. Furthermore, for measuring interna-
tional product market competition we use a real competitiveness indicator ( ∗p ) where 
euro-country weights are based on Finlands bilateral exports. For the substitution ef-
fects, we use two different variables: the share of Finlands imports from other EU-
countries in manufacturing production (m) and the share of the investment of EU-
countries to Finland in domestic investment ( ∗fdi ). The first variable attempts to meas-
ure foreign intermediate input outsourcing, the second attempts to measure overall sub-
stitution between labour and investment.86 
                                                 
85 Taking logarithms in conditional labour demand, equation (2.18) yields to the form which is very use-
ful for estimation. 
86 Koskela and König (2007) examine, using a theoretical framework, how strategic international out-
sourcing influences wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal 
profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation. They show that 
the wage elasticity of labour demand depends positively both on the amount of outsourcing and on the 
base wage, but negatively on the size of profit sharing. Furthermore, they find that committed profit shar-
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There is an issue that deserves some discussion here, namely that profit-sharing firms 
might exhibit greater employment stability - this effect might derive either from Weitz-
man´s model, where such firms are in a short-run excess demand for labour regime, or 
from the possibility that profit-sharing will cause remuneration to adjust more quickly to 
international shocks. We can test for this effect by examining the response of employ-
ment to international shocks by differencing. The scale effects measure the impact of 
international demand shocks on labour demand. These estimates test whether the re-
sponsiveness of profit-sharing firms to demand shocks differs from that of non-profit-
sharing firms. A smaller employment fluctuation requires that the coefficients for the 
change in industry output are smaller for profit-sharing firms. 
 
4  DATA 
 
Labour demand is estimated using assembled panel data from the manufacturing sector 
based on a diversity of sources: the surveys of the Confederation of Finnish Industries 
and Employers, the Longitudinal Database on Plants in Finnish Manufacturing (LDPM) 
of Statistics Finland, the Financial Market Statistics of Bank of Finland, the Foreign 
Trade Statistics of National Board of Customs, and the Industrial Structure Statistics of 
OECD STAN Database.87 The panel data covers the period from 1996 to 2004. The data 
from the Confederation of Finnish Industries and Employers includes individual level 
observations which are linked to the data of the respective firms. This survey gives 
firm-level information about the number of employees, base wages, bonus payments on 
the profit-sharing basis88, and worker's individual qualifications like education. All the 
firms in our data set are organized belonging to the data from the Confederation of Fin-
nish Industries and Employers. This means that all unorganized (mainly minor) industry 
firms are excluded from our analyses. The datasets used for our analysis consist of two 
panels: the first sample (PS) concerns 981 profit-sharing firms, and the second sample 
                                                                                                                                               
ing strategic outsourcing has a negative effect on wage formation, which is consistent with the assump-
tion of perfect substitutability between outsourcing and effective domestic labour. 
87 The manufacturing industries are included by the standard ISIC classification, i.e. excluding petroleum, 
energy, and quarrying. 
88 Profit-relating payments are determined here as performance-related payments which do not include 
benefits in kind, supplements for shift and earnings for overtime hours. 
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(NPS) concerns 115 non-profit-sharing firms. Each firm of the first sample was engaged 
in a profit-sharing agreement for at least one year. Demand estimation requires meas-
ures of employment, real labour prices, real investment and real output for all firm-year 
observations. The LDPM panel includes annual data for manufacturing plants covering 
such variables as production, investment, the price indices for production and invest-
ment, employment (production and non-production workers), and nominal wages and 
employer social security payments for production and non-production workers. The 
labour demand is supposed to depend on the labour costs negatively. The employment 
figure comes directly from the data set as the total number of production and non-
production workers. For total employment we construct real labour costs as nominal 
annual wages and social security payments deflated by the producer price index and 
divided by the number of workers.  
The ideal data here would be firm-level data because firms are the relevant units that 
actually demand factors. Plant-level data sets neither contain firm-level trade-prices nor 
all the measurements of foreign demand (supply) for firm-level products (non-labour 
inputs), so the next best alternative for these integration measurements is to use indus-
try-level (2-digit ISIC manufacturing industries) data. We construct the real competi-
tiveness indicator of the industry relevant to ith firm as the nominal competitiveness 
indicator multiplied by the terms of the trade ratio of export and import prices. The con-
structed nominal competitiveness indicator for the period 1996 - 2004 is based on Fi-
nancial Market Statistics maintained by Bank of Finland.  The industrial prices of ex-
ports and imports are based on the Producer Price Indices of Statistics Finland. An in-
crease in the real competitiveness indicator means that an industrys price competitive 
ability decreases which is supposed to decrease product demand and thus labour de-
mand. We construct two different variables for the scale effects of real output: the share 
of firms exports to other EU-countries in manufacturing production at firm level and 
the share of the industrial output of the European Union in industrial firms' production. 
Firms' exports to other EU-countries are based on Foreign Trade Statistics maintained 
by National Board of Customs. Another variable, the production of European Union for 
each industry relevant to ith firm is based on OECD Industrial Structure Statistics. In 
theory, labour demand is supposed to depend on production positively. If product de-
mand rises, thereby increasing production, firms demand for factors rises. The assump-
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tion is that higher exports signal better economies of scale (or less foreign competition). 
A rise in exports increases the production of industry, which is supposed to increase 
labour demand. On the other hand, the more the rest of the EU accounts for the output 
of industry, the more competitive that industry is for domestic firms. We construct two 
different variables for the substitution effects: the share of a firms imports from other 
EU-countries in firm-level production and the share of the industrial investment of other 
EU-countries to Finland in industrial firms' investment. Firms' imports from the EU-
countries are based on Foreign Trade Statistics maintained by National Board of Cus-
toms. Another variable, foreign direct investment for each industry relevant to ith firm 
is based on Financial Market Statistics of Bank of Finland. If demand for non-labour 
inputs were to increase, induced by increased demand for outputs and thus a higher pro-
duction level, this effect would increase labour demand. While foreign outsourcing 
and/or international investment provides an alternative for many production-intensive 
firms and thus decreases dependence on production labour, it also increases reliance on 
human capital and thus non-production labour.89 As a result, it is supposed that in-
creased foreign outsourcing and/or international investment decreases, especially, the 
demand of production labour. 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of the observations. PS firms, which are lar-
ger than NPS firms, perform better in international product markets in regard to the 
level of exports ratio and EU-output share. This different characteristic between PS 
firms and NPS firms allows us to think that profit-sharing firms are more under interna-
tional competitiveness pressure with access to the wider product market while NPS 
firms are more closed off from economic integration. Another important feature is that 
the level of labour costs is higher in PS firms, which indicates a higher skilled-worker 
ratio than in NPS firms. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether there is substitution 
between the base wage and the profit share.90 Furthermore, although PS firms perform 
better internationally, this is not necessarily due to profit-sharing. When exploring the 
issue of the effects fo profit-sharing, a simultaneity bias occurs due to the fact that 
                                                 
89 Empirical studies reviewed by Hamermesh (1993), usually point to a lower degree of substitution be-
tween skilled labour and capital than between unskilled labour and capital (see, e.g., Griliches 1969, 
Bergström and Panas 1992, Biscourp and Gianella 2001). 
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profit-sharing payments may be the outcome as well as the cause of better performance 
in international product markets. Let us underscore that we do not consider the effect of 
profit-sharing on international performance in this study. In this study we concentrate 
our econometric work on the aim of determining the effect of economic integration on 
the impact of profit sharing on employment. As we can see, profit sharing is likely to be 
more common for firms with a particular observable characteristic. Thus, self-selection 
of firms is an important characteristic of profit sharing. As we use a parametric method, 
instead of matching methods, we could not take account of the selection of firms into 
the conduct of profit sharing. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Variable summary statistics. 
 
 
Profit-sharing firms 
Variable    Mean      Std. Dev.      Min            Max  
Number of total workers (logarithm)  4.920        1.213         0.000         10.06 
Skilled workers ratio   0.357        0.232         0.000         1.000 
Real labour price (logarithm)   3.557        0.273        -1.670         7.610 
Profit-sharing ratio   0.011        0.021         0.000         0.387 
Competitiveness index (real)   0.935        0.105         0.702         1.414 
Exports ratio (real)   0.194        0.272         0.000         6.662 
EU-output share (real)  76750       60165          7732        323430 
Imports ratio (real)   525.4        3788          0.000        159793 
EU-investment share (real)   374.2        383.7         1.273         1463 
 
Non-profit-sharing firms 
Variable    Mean      Std. Dev.      Min            Max  
Number of total workers (logarithm)  4.314        0.853         2.708         7.090 
Skilled workers ratio   0.259        0.156         0.000         1.000 
Real labour price (logarithm)   3.383        0.243         2.468         4.248 
Competitiveness index (real)   0.935        0.105         0.702         1.414 
Exports ratio (real)   0.157        0.210         0.000         1.002 
EU-output share (real)  113622     78459          7732        323430 
Imports ratio (real)   1073         4720          0.000         57124 
EU-investment share (real)   361.5        422.9         1.273         1463 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
90 The most convincing result would be obtained from the estimation of a wage equation (see Wadhwani 
and Wall 1990). However, we had no appropriate variable to carry out this regression, i.e. we have no 
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5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Empirical studies on the effects of profit sharing have typically focused on its impact on 
productivity and employment through productivity effects. Cahuc and Dormont (1997) 
evaluate the consequences to productivity and employment of the large increase in 
profit-sharing in France. Their datasets used for this analysis consist of two panels of 
profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing manufacturing firms observed over the period 
1986-1989. The estimation of the employment equation in levels and growth rates 
shows that profit-sharing has ambiguous effects on employment. Kruse (1991) tests an 
implication of Weitzman's profit-sharing theory, namely that employment will be more 
stable in profit-sharing firms than in fixed-wage firms, using panel data on manufactur-
ing firms for the years 1971-1985. Adapting a dynamic labour demand framework for 
the U.S., his results suggest that the statistical association between aggregate unem-
ployment and employment at the firm level is less strong for profit-sharing firms. 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990) present a more formal test of this proposition in the context 
of a labour demand model. However, using British micro datasets over the period 1972-
1982, they find no difference in the effect of aggregate demand shocks on employment 
between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms. In contrast to these work, this 
study is the first to determine the effects of economic integration on the impact of 
profit-sharing on employment using data from the Finnish manufacturing sector.91 
 
5.1  Estimation strategy 
 
There are some issues to mention regarding the estimation strategy. One is the exogene-
ity of the regressors in the employment equation. As Hamermesh (1986) discusses, 
some of them might actually be endogenous variables. Quandt and Roser (1989) esti-
mated an equilibrium model of the labour market, and used it to test the assumption of 
production exogeneity. They did not reject the assumption that production is exogenous. 
                                                                                                                                               
information on union density or unemployment benefits. 
91 Kauhanen and Piekkola (2002) and Snellman et al. (2003) have examined the effects of profit sharing 
on earnings and productivity using Finnish linked employer-employee data. Their results suggest that 
profit-sharing has positive effects on productivity. 
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Furthermore, for the possibility of the endogeneity of investment, the presence of capital 
market imperfections suggests that firms will find it difficult to adjust investment 
quickly in response to exogenous shocks that may influence employment decisions.92 If 
some regressors are, in fact, endogenous, then least-squares parameter estimates will 
suffer from an endogeneity bias, the net direction of which is not clear. 
Panel samples offer a number of possibilities for structuring and handling data, 
which lead to various types of estimators. In the case of a standard linear regression 
model, if it is well specified, the various estimators should all be consistent. Conversely, 
the differences of various estimators, when significant, imply some sort of specification 
error, and this can provide formal specification tests (Hausman and Taylor 1979). 
Therefore, a useful tack is to present the results of within-firm estimates by relying on 
deviations to firm-level means and first-difference estimates using yearly growth rates. 
The typical transformation applied to panel data is that variables are in logs of levels. 
A third issue, as is usual with micro data, is that our variables suffer from measure-
ment errors because we have no information, at the firm level, on factor utilization rates, 
hours of work and prices. However, the main difficulty stems from the lack of an esti-
mate of capital average age at the microeconomic level. Therefore, it was difficult to 
accurately adjust capital stock for inflation. This measurement problem does not seri-
ously affect the estimates when they are carried out on the level of the production vari-
ables of firm i in year t. In this case, as Cahuc and Dormont (1997) argue, the variance 
due to differences between firms is largely predominant, and much greater than the 
variance due to measurement errors of this kind. This is no longer true, as Griliches and 
Hausman (1986) argue, when regressions use first differences, which give more impor-
tance to ´noises´ due to measurement errors. Taking time differences also controls for 
unobserved time-invariant industry fixed effects which influence the labour-demand 
level. However, time-differencing can also aggravate the regressor measurement error 
and result in inconsistent estimates. Hsiao (1986) argues that if variables are indeed sub-
ject to measurement errors, exploiting panel data to control for the effects of unobserved 
individual characteristics using standard differenced estimators may result in even more 
biased estimates than simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators using cross-
                                                 
92 Capital stock is estimated as the real value of machinery, equipment, transportation equipment, build-
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sectional data alone. Thus, we first estimate the employment equation for the levels by 
OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. Furthermore, to minimize inconsis-
tency, Griliches and Hausman (1986) suggest that employment should be estimated us-
ing long differences. When concern focuses on trends over time rather than levels, the 
bias of measurement might not influence decisively. However, our set of data has a re-
stricted sample size both in the cross-section dimension and the time dimension. One 
limitation of the data is the short period covered by the profit sharing survey. As a result 
of our data restrictions we do not take longer differences. In fact, we proceed with the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, which provides a convenient 
framework for obtaining consistent and, at least, asymptotically efficient estimators for 
the dynamic panel data (Bond, 2002). More specifically, equation (3.1) was estimated 
using the first-differenced GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
method estimates the model in first differences but uses lagged variables in levels as 
instruments. 
A fourth issue is that the profit sharing survey data only tell us the share of a firm´s 
profit that has been paid out. They do not show those firms that have a profit sharing 
plan, but have not paid profit shares, as the goals were not achieved. It is very likely that 
this will influence the estimates. 
 
5.2  Estimation results 
 
In the first instance, we limit the presentation of our results to regressions performed on 
the profit-sharing sample with and without the effects of economic integration. Every 
firm in the PS sample does not operate a profit-sharing scheme for each year of the pe-
riod. Consequently, the number of NPS firms fell to 115 owing any profit-sharing ob-
servation during our period. We notice that NPS firms produce more for the domestic 
market with a higher import penetration, while PS firms produce more for export com-
peting markets. Because of slight performance in international product markets for the 
non-profit-sharing sample, we also estimate specification including the interaction term 
with profit sharing for the total sample of PS and NPS firms. We add a profit-sharing 
                                                                                                                                               
ings and structures. 
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dummy variable for firms that had at least one of the profit-sharing schemes to the equa-
tion, and interact it with economic integration measures. The estimations are carried out 
with and without the variable skill. We present here the results with the skilled-worker 
ratio which do not differ from the results obtained without this variable.  
 
 
Table 5.1  Regression results for employment on the profit-sharing sample without the effects 
of economic integration 
 
 
Notes: (1) The specification is 
itititititit
w
itiit eskillkypaL +++++++= )()ln()ln()()ln()()ln( χδγψωαπρ  where 
L log of quantity of labour employed, π w  profit-sharing payments/wages, ω  log of ((base wage + employer social 
security payments) / number of workers), p  implicit price index of production, y log of production, k log of capital 
stock, and skill skilled workers / total employment. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Column [1]: 
estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond 
(1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test 
for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors. 
 
 
Our estimated labour demand without the effects of economic integration is pre-
sented in Table 5.1. And, the results with the effects of economic integration for the 
employment function estimates are reported in Table 5.2. In our first-difference esti-
mates, we allow for dynamics through a quite simple (given the short period available) 
partial adjustment mechanism. Moreover, the high dominance of between-firm differ-
ences in the levels variability is concomitant with serious autocorrelations of variables 
and residuals. This leads the estimates to be biased as soon as the model is specified in 
an autoregressive pattern. These estimates, if only, test whether the responsiveness of 
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.200 (8.96)
Labour price -0.817 (-34.6) -0.851 (-35.0)
Profit-sharing 0.008 (0.05) -0.030 (-0.21)
Skilled workers -0.211 (-5.48) -0.072 (-1.59)
Price index -0.333 (-6.94) -0.397 (-6.73)
Production 0.671 (84.9) 0.585 (64.5)
Capital stock 0.057 (10.3) 0.073 (10.3)
Number of obs 5580 3896
R² (within) 0.774
F-test (p-value) 1148.96 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 59.23 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.706)
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profit-sharing firms to demand shocks differs from the responsiveness of non-profit-
sharing firms. Determining the effect of economic integration on the impact of profit-
sharing on employment, we keep the static form to estimate labour demand in levels, 
which is in accordance with the cross-section feature of total regression. 
 
 
Table 5.2  Regression results for employment on the profit-sharing sample with the effects of 
economic integration 
 
 
Notes: (1) The specification is  
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where L log of quantity of labour employed, π w  profit-sharing payments/wages, ω  log of ((base wage + employer 
social security payments) / number of workers), p∗  industry international price index, x firm's exports to EU-
countries / firm's production, y∗  EU-countries' industry production / firm's industry production, m firm's imports 
from EU-countries / firms' production, fdi ∗  EU- countries' industry foreign direct investment / firms' industry capi-
tal stock, and skill skilled workers / total employment. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Column 
[1]: estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond 
(1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test 
for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors. 
 
 
Considering the results without the effects of economic integration in Table 5.1, the 
estimated coefficients, generally, have the expected effects. The coefficients of produc-
tion and capital (on logs of levels) are significant and have the expected signs. As ex-
pected, the price of production and labour has a negative effect on labour demand. 
However, the coefficients of labour demand elasticity with own price are unexpected 
large. These results remain unchanged when introducing a lagged value of employment 
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.463 (10.9)
Labour price -0.444 (-13.8) -0.680 (-19.1)
Profit-sharing 1.666 (5.96) 0.210 (0.78)
Skilled workers -2.382 (-41.7) -1.618 (-21.9)
Competitiveness -0.117 (-1.69) -0.132 (-1.98)
Exports 0.155 (4.92) 0.066 (1.78)
EU-output -0.0001 (-1.83) -0.0001 (-2.39)
Imports -0.0001 (-3.38) -0.0001 (-4.10)
EU-investment -0.0001 (-1.46) -0.0001 (-1.36)
Number of obs 6595 4576
R² (within) 0.343
F-test (p-value) 182.79 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 70.73 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.668)
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through the use of autoregressive specification. When considering the profit-sharing 
effect, we notice that these regressions lead to the insignificant effect of profit-sharing 
on labour demand. This result supports other findings on profit-sharing, which use dif-
ferent samples and techniques (Cahuc and Dormont 1997, Wadhwani and Wall 1990). 
With the effects of economic integration, the estimates, generally, seem (in Table 
5.2) plausible and well estimated. All the explanatory variables have the expected ef-
fect, except that the share of foreign direct investment is not significant. As stressed 
above, this non-significance may be viewed as the outcome of measurement errors, 
which mainly affect our investment variable. As the integration process forces firms to 
face heightened foreign competition, we see that the negative coefficients measuring 
these effects provide support for the assumption that higher competition decreases la-
bour demand. Whereas, the positive coefficient associated with market power suggests 
that when economic integration is associated with better advantages from economies 
scale employment improves. The elasticity of labour demand with own price is in-
creased when first-differences are performed. Turning to the profit-sharing effect, the 
most noteworthy result is the positive coefficient that we find whatever the estimate 
performed. The regression of column (1) on levels shows that the estimated parameter 
equals 1.666. In comparison to the result without the effects of economic integration, 
these results for levels indicate that economic integration has a significant, positive ef-
fect on the impact of profit-sharing on employment. However, the first-difference esti-
mates lead to a non-significant, positive effect for profit-sharing on employment. There-
fore, we do not find that profit-sharing firms might exhibit greater employment stability 
during the process of economic integration. 
In table 5.3 we look at how the impact of increased profit sharing varies with eco-
nomic integration by considering the interaction with foreign comparative advantage, 
price competition and investing/outsourcing. All the explanatory variables have the ex-
pected effect, except that the share of foreign direct investment and the competitiveness 
indicator are not significant. These results on levels indicate that profit-sharing has a 
significant, positive effect on employment, while the first-difference estimates lead to a 
insignificant positive effect. In our hypothesis, weaker advantages from economies of 
scale will increase incentives for using profit sharing and thus decrease wages, which 
increases labour demand. As the interaction between profit-sharing and foreign com-
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parative advantage measures is negative and significant, the results for levels provide 
evidence that an increase in profit sharing increases employment less in the presence of 
a favourable comparative advantage. However, the insignificant interaction coefficient 
between profit-sharing and competitiveness does not reveal whether an increase in 
profit sharing increases employment more in the presence of strong trade competition. 
According to our hypothesis, higher product market competition will increase incentives 
for using profit sharing and thus decrease wages, which increases labour demand. As 
the interaction between profit-sharing and foreign outsourcing measure is negative and 
significant, the result for levels indicates that an increase in profit sharing increases em-
ployment less in the presence of intensive outsourcing, while the insignificant interac-
tion coefficient between profit-sharing and investment indicates that profit sharing is not 
associated with the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
 
 
Table 5.3  Regression results for employment on the total sample with interaction effects 
 
 
Notes: (1) PS-dummy=1 for profit-sharing firms. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Column [1]: 
estimated by OLS with fixed effects including time dummies. (4) Column [2]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond 
(1991) dynamic panel data estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test 
for first and second order autocorrelation of the differenced errors. 
Method Fixed effects First-differences GMM
[1] [2]
Employment 0.479 (11.3)
Labour price -0.449 (-15.1) -0.680 (-20.4)
Profit-sharing 3.186 (1.60) 1.893 (0.86)
Skilled workers -2.264 (-42.5) -1.537 (-22.5)
PS-dummy*Competitiveness 1.325 (0.65) -0.907 (-1.05)
PS-dummy*Exports -2.670 (-3.73) -0.761 (-0.39)
PS-dummy*EU-output -0.0001 (-1.75) -0.0001 (-1.14)
PS-dummy*Imports -0.0006 (-3.66) -0.0001 (-0.59)
PS-dummy*EU-investment 0.0002 (0.25) -0.0008 (-1.05)
Competitiveness -0.092 (-1.41) -0.111 (-1.75)
Exports 0.247 (6.62) 0.087 (2.22)
EU-output -0.0001 (-2.21) -0.0001 (-2.37)
Imports -0.0001 (-2.92) -0.0001 (-3.94)
EU-investment -0.0001 (-1.41) -0.0001 (-1.31)
Number of obs 7523 5259
R² (within) 0.329
F-test (p-value) 149.75 (0.000)
Sargan test  (p-value) 73.5 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.656)
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For the dynamic approach, in all Tables, the Arellano-Bond test for first and second-
order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals is reported. The first-differenced 
GMM method estimates the model in first differences but uses lagged variables in levels 
as instruments. By GMM, the model was estimated under the assumption that outputs 
and inputs are exogenous. Specific assumptions on endogeneity can then be easily 
tested using the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. At first, this model may 
seem well specified because the Sargan test does not reject the hypothesis of over-
identifying restrictions, nor does it reject the null hypothesis of no first order correlation 
as implied by the AR(1) test. However, as we see, the AR(2) test rejects the null hy-
pothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. The presence of second-order autocorrela-
tion would imply that estimates are inconsistent. Hence, it would show that the estima-
tors of this dynamic approach perform worse than estimators for levels. 
For all the reasons stated above, we should believe in results relying on levels that 
profit-sharing improves employment in the process of economic integration, although 
there is no evidence that it contributes to the stability of employment. 
 
 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was twofold to investigate the effects of economic integration 
on the impact of profit sharing on employment by using theoretical modelling and em-
pirical analysis. We built the theoretical framework for estimating employment and de-
termining the impact of economic integration on the effects of profit sharing. Using a 
general theoretical model of intra-industry trade, we examined how economic integra-
tion changes the impact of profit sharing on employment. The model captured both ef-
fects running from product markets (scale effects) as well as factor substitutions possi-
bilities (substitution effects) to the impact of profit sharing on labour demand. We 
showed that the scale effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on 
employment clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better 
advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the ability of 
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profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increases due to 
moderated wages. In contrast, when economic integration is associated with increased 
market power, in turn, the ability of profit sharing to improve employment decreases 
due to higher wages. Our theoretical model suggests that as increased trade competition 
crowds out better advantages from economies of scale, economic integration increases 
profit sharing through wage-moderating and thus improves labour demand. In addition, 
if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital increases during the process 
of integration, incentives for using profit sharing decrease with higher relative labour 
price, which decreases labour demand. 
We formulated an econometric model which aimed to determine whether European 
integration has changed the impact of profit sharing on employment in Finland, using 
data from the manufacturing sector from 1996 to 2004. Our findings provide support for 
the argument that economic integration strengthens the positive impact of profit-sharing 
on employment. However, we do not find that profit-sharing firms exhibit greater em-
ployment stability during the process of economic integration. These results provide 
evidence for the hypothesis that profit-sharing improves employment during the process 
of economic integration, but that it can have ambiguous effects on the stability of em-
ployment. 
Finally, the study indicates a potentially interesting area for future research. One area 
for further research would be to extend the integration model to capture the effect of 
profit-sharing on wage formation and thus on structural unemployment. The most con-
vincing result would be obtained from the estimation of a wage equation determining 
whether there is substitution between the base wage and profit sharing. 
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